Abstract: The present paper deals with the history of military relations between two states from Eastern Europe. Using both diplomatic and military documents we try to underline the importance of such relations in a period when both Romania and Yugoslavia were actively implied in foreign policies regarding the national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, international cooperation, defense of territorial status quo and the international treaties concluded after the First World War. Regional security system in central and southeastern Europe during this period was based on two documents of great importance: The Pact of the Reorganization of the Little Entente (February 1933) and Balkan Pact (February 1934).

Keywords: military alliances, protocol, Balkan Entente, army
body," open to the accession of other States (February 1933)" and the Balkan Pact (February 1934) under which the Balkan Entente was formed. The diplomats of the two countries have seen the "European continent covered by regional pacts\(^1\) which "by binding to each other" should be "the peace barbed wire\(^2\).

The End of 1933 marked a new turning point for Europe. On October 14, 1933, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and left the work of Disarmament Conference, which marked a new phase, characterized by a long string of territorial revisions imposed by fascist states. On November 16, 1933, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Paul Boncour said to ambassadors of London, Rome and Berlin that "the lack of unity of powers entitled to defend the treaties of Versailles does nothing more than to encourage the attitude of Germany, especially on the arms issue\(^3\).

Together with its partners in the Little Entente, Romania pursued a policy designed "to respect the current organization of central Europe based on existing treaties, in other words, to preserve the integrity of national territory, to prevent the kneeling of its allies"\(^4\). Such a policy would need concrete measures to counter climate of international instability and to ensure legal and military instruments of national security defense\(^5\).

On December, 11, 1933 in Košice, Nicolae Titulescu and Edvard Beneš met to express the decision of the countries they represented to remain on the front of the anti-revisionist and to stand firm on the maintenance of peace. Edvard Beneš, after few days in Paris, said to the French Foreign Minister that he considered necessary to improve relations between the Little Entente and Russia before the German threat\(^6\).

Romania and Yugoslavia military experts have compiled since 1933, when Hitler took power in Germany, analysis materials of the situation both of the domestic and international situation. These documents were sent to the offices of Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. On their basis, the foreign ministers have set topics for discussion at the conferences and meetings in the two regional organizations: Little Entente and Balkan Entente. At the session of the Little Entente Permanent Council in Zagreb, which began on January, 22, 1934, the foreign ministers of the three member states, after considering the international political situation, have decided to intensify their

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1 See Mircea Muşat, Ion Ardeleanu, Romania after the Great Union, II\(^{nd}\) vol., 2\(^{nd}\) part, Bucureşti, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1988, pp. 1340-1341
3 Documents Diplomatiques Françaises (Hereinafter will be cited DDF), 1ère série, tome 5, doc. no. 20.
4 Romanian Military Archives (hereafter will be cited AMR), fond 948, dos. 438, f. 484.
5 Campus Eliza, Mica Antantă, București, Editura Științifică, 1968, p. 166.
6 DDF, 1\(^{ère}\) série, tome 5, doc. no. 137.
cooperation and to peacefully pass “from the defensive lesson, observed, so far, to the offensive lesson, deciding to widening participation in plans and projects designed to strengthen European security”\(^7\). During the same session, in order to counter revisionism that threatened south-eastern Europe, it was decided that it was imperative to accelerate negotiations for the Balkan Pact. The result was reflected in the work of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, which occurred as a strong military alliances engaged in the fight to eradicate revisionism\(^8\).

French and British policy, having not a response to the review actions of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon and the expansionist tendencies of Italy and Germany in Central Europe and the Balkans, were affected the interests of Romania and Yugoslavia.

The Balkan Pact, signed on February, 9, 1934 in Athens by Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey, was an important step in the vicinity of the Balkan countries in support of a defensive system against the revisionist current which was manifested on the European continent. Balkan Entente aimed “maintaining the territorial order established in 1918-1920, ensuring mutual security for all Balkan borders”\(^9\), the obligation of signatory states to consult on measures to be taken in circumstances that could affect their interests. According to art. 2 from the annex-protocol, “the Balkan Entente Pact is not directed against any power. Its aim is to ensure the security of the Balkan borders against any aggression from a Balkan state”\(^10\).

On March 17, 1934, in Rome, Mussolini and Dollfuss Gömbös have signed agreements which put up a new revisionist bloc in central Europe. In order to coordinate foreign policy, the three states pursued a common goal: the promotion of Italian and Horthy interests and plans\(^11\).

The intensification of the revisionist pressure worried political and military circles from Romania and Yugoslavia. Expressing his approval of the

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\(^7\) Eliza Campus, cited work, p. 166.


\(^10\) Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives (hereafter will be cited AMAER), the Balkan Entente fund, dos. 39 Balkan Entente Pact with Protocol-Annex, signed in Athens on February 9, 1934.


227
Romanian foreign policy directions and objectives, Iuliu Maniu, head of the largest opposition political party, called all national political forces to join for supporting an active internationally policy, according to national interests. The Policy Makers of military leadership have supported this point of view. The working paper of the Chief of the General Staff Office from March 18, 1934, sent to the Foreign Minister stated “the need for unity and peace-loving forces of those people who kept and loved Romania.”

In the next period, Romania had an intense international diplomatic activity and expressed its point of view in favor of penalizing the perpetrator, for effective measures to strengthen peace and security of peoples. Given that the League of Nations ceased to be sufficient guarantee for the security and sovereignty of states in central and southeastern Europe, Romanian and Yugoslav government tried to strengthen the defense capacity. Balkan Pact was followed by two military agreements signed by Romania and Turkey on the one hand, and Yugoslavia and Turkey on the other hand. Turkey has provided military support to Romania and Yugoslavia in the event of a Balkan conflict, and thus the two bilateral agreements have been turned into a military convention between Romania, Yugoslavia and Turkey, similar to that of the Little Entente, which was initialed in Belgrade on November 29, 1935. Military representatives of the three Little Entente Member States met in Belgrade in the autumn and discussed in detail the situation created by the Italian-Abyssinian conflict. Alliances between France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, Franco-Italian relations were considered favorable because Yugoslavia had come under threat by the convention with Turkey Italian, treaty guaranteeing free passage through straits.

Since the end of 1933 until the summer of 1936, policymakers and military authorities in Romania have taken all military and diplomatic measures that it considered necessary in view of a new outbreak of a world conflagration. On January 9, 1934, the Romanian General Staff submit to the Minister of National Defense a study that highlighted the need to coordinate military action with the new European politico-strategic terms. Analyzing the financial situation of the Romanian army and its ability to fight and comparing it to the dangers which lurked us, the General Staff has asked the Superior Council of Country’s Defense, on February 21, 1934, the adoption of urgent measures for quick reorganization and equipping of the army. Among the military measures that the Romanian state has sought to take in order to defend the unity and independence, included the trip to Romania at the Gh. Tătărașcu’s invitation, the secret mission led by General Victor Petin between 3-8 April 1934, an occasion for French General to mention that N. Titulescu and Charles II agreed to achieve, yet in peacetime, a full and rapid coordination of the military actions that would be jointly undertaken if Germany implemented the Anschluss and

12 AMR, fond 548, dos. 93/1934, f. 314.
Hungary violated treaties. In his turn, Ion Antonescu informed French General about the Additional Protocol signed at the Conference of the Chiefs of the Little Entente armies in Bucharest on March 1934, stressing the importance of the provisions of this act if a probable military cooperation between France and the Little Entente a generalized conflict. In conclusion, Petin expressed his agreement and aid to support the efforts for the endowment of the Romanian army.

Internally, in the years that followed the crisis of overproduction were developed concrete measures to ensure the material base for Romanian Army. On April 18, 1934, the Chief of General Staff ordered to Sections III, IV and VI of this organism to produce each of them, until April 25 a study “regarding the equipment of the Western Front for a preventive mobilization.”

On April 24 was presented the “Western Front equipment study on the preventive mobilization” and next day the movement plan towards the western border of the 6th and 7th army troops, the Mountain Rangers and 1st and 2nd Cavalry Division, works that included the whole set of measures and military actions which were on the base of the “Hypothesis X” which provided the Romanian military response in the case of an outbreak of a generalized war. On July 25, 1934 (the day of Dollfuss’s assassination), Charles II had approved the “Directive no. 1”, document which laid down measures to be implemented in the case of outbreak of the conflict on the Western Front.

The political situation in Austria has determined the accelerating of the Romanian strategic measures. For preparing the army to intervene if the situation required it, the Chief of General Staff ordered to Section I, through the provisory note no. 169 of 30 July 1934 “to follow the speeding up the dispatch of the call-up for “Hypothesis X” so that in the shortest time (several days) application of this hypothesis would be possible.” Also, Division II Information, received the mission to concentrate its entire activity on events in Austria, to closely monitor movements of troops from Italy to produce the final form of the “information plans and searches for Hypothesis X.”

The main concern of the Romanian state on the military plan until the outbreak of the Second World War became the strengthening of the west side of the national defense system. A note from the General Staff which concern the military measure determined and implemented in the first period of 1934, warned that it must “undertake measures concerning only this front in order to not cause suspicions from the other neighbors and in particular from the Russian side which we found in the negotiations for the recognition of borders and the

13 DDF, 1ère série, tome 6, doc. nr. 70.
14 AMR, fond 332, dos. 30, f. 247.
15 AMR, fond 332, dos. 30, f. 99.
16 Ibid, f. 100.
resumption of diplomatic relations.” Military measures that have been taken and politico-military relations initiated in early 1934 responded to the management imperatives of foreign policy and implicitly internal issues.

During 1934-1936, both Romania and Yugoslavia signed military agreements with Turkey and Greece. Bilateral alliances have been evolved under the impulse of some political and economic military needs, to set up the mentioned groups. Military Conventions that Romania and Yugoslavia initiated or to which they adhered during 1921-1936, had a defensive character, in accordance with the principles of their foreign policy, with the provisions of the pact of League of Nations. Governments from Bucharest and Belgrade have tried and succeeded that their political and military commitments “to not harm in a some way the security of other states, or to generate apprehension or equivocs about the honesty of peace policy and good neighborhood that they promoted.”

Little Entente and then Balkan Entente exerted a positive acting upon the international environment in general, upon the stability of the Balkans. Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union had to take into account the response capacity of Romania and its allies. Military Documents speak about the fact that Little Entente could mobilize, if it needed, 356 battalions, 486 batteries, 92 squadrons and 43 flotillas, and Balkan Entente could mobilize “435 battalions, 540 batteries, 88 squadrons and 36 flotillas.”

In October 1935 the favorable premises opened by the agreement Laval-Mussolini were extinguished, the Italian attack on Abyssinia forcing Balkan Entente to take place. In December 1935 the UK government has asked the governments of Turkey and Yugoslavia that “if the special military measures would be directed against Great Britain by Italy, they would be willing, if necessary, to give competition to the resistance and had the power to do so.” After consulting the governments of Romania and Czechoslovakia, the Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav governments responded affirmatively to The Great Britain, informing the governments of France and Italy on this. Seeing in Fascist Italy a danger that threaten their independence, the three countries from the south-eastern Europe were ready to respond to a possible fascist aggression, putting it under the aegis of Great Britain. Bulgaria was considered under the military and human potential of the four allied countries. The Military Convention was intended to stipulate only the common defense of any attack by a great power, alone or in alliance with a Balkan state.

Romania and Yugoslavia have acted to close the two countries to France. Nicolae Titulescu protested against the entering of the German units in the

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17 Idem, fond 948, dos. 437, f. 401.
20 Ibid, f. 110. The foreign minister of Romania’s note.
demilitarized zone, on March, 7, 1936. The same day, Yugoslavia declared that “its army sit at France’s disposal if circumstances should require it”\textsuperscript{21}. The position of Romania and Yugoslavia, favorable to the implementation of some effective action under the dome of the League of Nations to counter the revisionist aggressive policy pursued by the Third Reich, was presented internally in military terms by adopting urgent measures that have targeted border coverage of the two countries. Romanian Government convened on March 9, 1936 the meeting of the Supreme Council of Country’s Defense which have discussed possible political and military implications of German act, deciding “to urgent the actions aimed at putting into combat the great army units intended to intervene in the case of the outbreak of a generalized conflict”\textsuperscript{22}. The decisions have been included by the General Staff in a package of measures aimed at “improving the army mobilization plan” to meet commitments “concerning operational connection with the Allied armies”\textsuperscript{23}. Next period, the Operations Department of the General Staff presented to the policy and military makers the study called \textit{Little Entente’s strategy in a generalized conflict}.\textsuperscript{24} According to the assumed obligations, the authors have found who are the allies and enemies of Romania and Yugoslavia. The decisions adopted by the Romanian General Staff were communicated to the Yugoslavia General Staff. 1936 ended with the conclusion of two military agreements in the Balkan Entente. On November, 10, 1936, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey signed at Bucharest the military convention which provided in art. 14, that “if one of the contracting powers is at war with another state, whatever it may be, the other Contracting Powers pledge to let them pass through their territory and waters for the transport of war material destined to the so-called contracting powers, and, in the same time, giving them the facilities that they will need, including the supply.”\textsuperscript{25} The Convention had a great importance for Romania, opening a gateway to the Mediterranean, Thessaloniki, in the case of the closure or blocking of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. After in February 1937, were settled Greece and Yugoslavia’s reservations made upon signature, military convention took the final shape, being signed in Bucharest on May 12, 1937. The preamble of the Convention contained the specification that it was obligatory for Greece only to the extent required for Italy. The Convention provided that:

\textsuperscript{21} See Mircea Muşat, Ion Ardeleanu, \textit{cited work}, p. 1387.
\textsuperscript{22} AMR, fond 948, The Secretariat of Country’s Defense Supreme Council, dos. 12, f. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid}, dos. 456, f. 178.
\textsuperscript{24} AMR, fond 948/R.S.S.3, dos. 1414, f. 180.
\textsuperscript{25} AMAER, dos. 37, f. 216. Four military Convention, signed on November, 10, 1936, by Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey.
If one of the contracting powers threatened by “military preparations or hostile procedures of Bulgaria or Albania (working alone or together, or each of these two countries together with Hungary alone, or all these countries together) would be obliged to take special military measures or to decree the mobilization, the government of the called contracting power will inform about this the governments of the other contracting powers, which pledge to take at once, against Bulgaria (respectively against Albania – Romania and Turkey having not common borders with Albania, all measures concerning the actions against this country will be ensured by Greece and Yugoslavia) and against Hungary – Greece and Turkey having not common borders with Hungary, all the actions against this country will be ensured by Romania and Yugoslavia 26.

In the same time, it is mentioned that once the mobilization was decreed, the allied powers “do not suspend this action, even if other powers, whatever it would be, joined to the enemy” 27.

By overcoming the tight framework of the relations between the four countries allied with Bulgaria, this military convention is part of the large framework of the European antirevisionist policy pursued by Balkan Entente because it hinder the Balkan revisionist states to openly promote an aggressive policy, and also it hinder the great fascist powers to use these states as “pawns in a large-scale military action in south-eastern Europe” 28. The importance of this convention, also, lies in the consolidation of the regional security.

Although many of the four states’ interests were the same, they also pursued distinct goals. The main objective of the policy pursued by Greece and Turkey was the maintenance of the status quo in Mediterranean, which is why, in the second half of 1937 the two countries have concluded a military alliance against Italy. This was motivated by suspicion aroused by Yugoslavia following the conclusion of the Italian-Yugoslav pact in March 1937 and perpetual friendship pact Bulgarian-Yugoslav, in January 1937 that stated “between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia will be eternal peace” 29. Through this promise of “eternal peace”, the pact contravened the military obligations which were incumbent on Yugoslavia on the base of the two military conventions which resulted from the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente because in the case of a Bulgarian aggression against one of its allies (Romania or Turkey), Yugoslavia could not act against Bulgaria.

Regarding the Mediterranean, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey had the same interests: keeping good relations with Italy and the alliance with Great Britain which can use in case they need. About this aspect, the Chief of the General Staff of Greece stressed at the Ankara Conference in October, 1937, that

26 Ibid dos. 37, f. 132. Note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 1939.
27 Ibid.
28 Dumitru Tuțu, cited work, p. 132.
29 AMAER, fond Balkan Entente, dos. 38, f. 29.
“this military collaboration ends as soon as one of the four contracting parties were at war with another power except those mentioned in the military convention in four, namely: Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania”30. This point of view were shared by the Yugoslav delegation but not by Romanian one, who shown that “this exclusively regards Greece; military cooperation of the Romanian, Yugoslav and Turkish army must remain valid even if Greece doesn’t intervene”31. Greece’s reservations led to the conclusion of a military convention between the other three allies (Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia) signed on November 6, 1936, the exchange of ratification instruments being made in Bucharest on April 19, 1937. Although almost identical in content to the convention in four, this agreement still had something more: the commitments to the three states were regulated more firmly while under the Convention in four, the Greece’s participation depended on the Greek government’s unilateral decision32.

Between October, 28 – November, 4, 1937, the military representatives of the four member states of the Balkan Entente met in Ankara, to a conference, to elaborate the cooperation plan of the four army if one of the combatant powers has been aggressed by a Balkan state (plan which included four hypothesis). The protocol was elaborated by the military delegations of Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece according to the provisions of the printed military agreement which stipulated that, once the action started, it had continued even if one of the great powers join to the aggressor Balkan state. With this occasion, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, Marchal Fawzi Cakmak, sent a letter to the Chief of the Romanian General Staff, General Ion Sichitiu, through which it was mitigated the Turkey’s reservation about the signing of the Balkan Pact33, pointing out that in case of a Bulgarian attack against Romania, which occur at the same time with a Soviet attack, Turkey would fulfill its obligations by attacking Bulgaria34.

In December 1938, in Athens, was held the last conference of the four allied countries’ military delegates, where there have been occurred some modifications and additions to the operations projects established by the Protocol. 1 from 1937, and, in the same time, had been ended special protocols for cooperation and ties between Turkish and Greek armies35, Yugoslav and

30 Ibid. dos. 38, f. 392. Note by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, March, 8, 1938.
31 Ibid.
32 Dumitru Tuțu, cited work, p. 134.
33 AMR, Microfilm collection, roll 184, frame 11,109; AMAER, fund 71/Balkan Entente, dos. 38, f. 392.
34 According to the friendship and nonaggression treaty between Turkey and the USSR none of the party could enter in a “combination” with one of the neighboring states of the other party without its consent (AMR 948/RSS fund, dos. 456, f. 67
35 AMAER, fund 71/ Balkan Entente, dos. 38, f. 203. In July-September 1938 were held as meetings of experts Staffs: July 1938, Ankara - experts meeting broadcast links, July-
Greek, respectively, special protocols for aviation cooperation, naval cooperation, links and transmissions for national collaboration. Due to the Greek government hesitation concerning the maintenance of a neutral position if a conflict between Italy and Balkan Pact would have burst out, the Romanian government tried to find to what extend he could rely on the usage, during war, of Yugoslav free zone at Thessaloniki, in case Greece hadn’t taken part in the conflict. Thus, discussing the political situation from Balkan at the end of 1938, the chief of the great Romanian staff declared that, taking into account “Bulgaria’s geographical position as well as the ratio forces, there was a slight chance that it would attack alone one of the ally in a completely Balkan conflict and that it would lead all alone the war”.

The situation from Balkan could have been redressed by a convention concluded between Bulgaria and Balkan Pact, which it really happened, the five states signed, at Athens, on 31 July 1938, an agreement through which they pledged to “refrain from resorting to force in their mutual relations”. At the same time, they renounced the application of the part IV dispositions (the military, naval and aerial stipulations) of the Neuilly Treaty, as well as the provisions of Lausanne Convention from 24 July 1924.

The Czechoslovak crisis unleashed in September 1938 worsened increasingly the international situation. Right after the Nürnberg speech (12 September 1938) through which Hitler made public his intention of annexing, without plebiscite, the south region from Czechoslovakia, inhabited by German population, the governments from Budapest and Warsaw joined the revisionist pretentions of Berlin, adding their own demands. The Balkan states were in the extreme delicate situation of searching other methods of counteract the foreign dangers, without stirring Germany and Italy’s violent reactions. That’s the reason why, in the military meetings from Athens the participants proved a lot of precaution and lack of firmness in taking the decisions.

On February 4, 1939, Stojadinovic cabinet resigned. The new Yugoslav government, led by Dragisa Cvetkovic, proved to be more favorable to the maintenance of relations “more cordial and sincere” between Romania and Yugoslavia than Stojadinovic government that “even though, generally, it priced, for certain events, the alliances with Romania, were not its focus”. The refreshing of the relations between the two countries was due also to other factors such as meetings between King Charles II and Prince Paul, Gregory

August 1938, Athens - naval experts meeting, 1938, Belgrade - aero expert meeting, in September 1938, Bucharest - gathering material for your cooperation.

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
40 AMR, fond 456, dos. 321/1939, f. 263.
Gafencu’s visit, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade, the arriving at Belgrade of Victor Cădere, the Ambassador of Romania and last but not the least, the Balkan Entente conference. According to the Report no. 86 from 3.II.1939 of Romania’s military attaché in Yugoslavia, Gheorghe Popescu, Grigore Gafencu’s visit was at a very opportune moment since it was preceded by the visit of Count Ciano, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister’s visit was regarded as “necessary for the Yugoslav people because it was in the sense of mass, which does not trust the honesty of Italy friendship demonstrations, but cherishes the Romania alliance”.

A positive impact had the presentation of the Victor Cădere’s letters of accreditation, an event organized with great fast. The accreditation “had, among other things, the gift to flatter the vanity of Yugoslav people, which received for the first time an Ambassador and to update […] the good relations between Romania and Yugoslavia”.

The period in which Romania has acted as an active factor in establishing the means and of legal and material policy instruments of collective security, seemed in 1939, as a remote past. The second great global conflagration was fast approaching, the revengeful and revisionist powers had achieved the victory in the confrontation with those powers which loved peace, understanding and maintaining the status quo of Versailles System.

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid, f. 145.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid, dos. 638, f. 478.