

# THE POLISH CRISIS AND THE CONFERENCE OF LEADERS' PARTIES AND STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION (MOSCOW, 4 – 5 DECEMBER 1980)

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**Abstract:** The exponential development of the “Solidarity” trade union and the permanent hesitations of Warsaw authorities, who avoided to enforce the martial law and to intervene in force for the repressing of popular movements in the entire country, determined the leaders of WTO’s states to meet at Moscow (4-5 December 1980) for convincing Stanislaw Kania to utilize harder means to re-establish the order in Poland.

The respective reunion started on December 4, 1980 without the participation of the leader of the Polish communist party, only one day after Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov solicited the agreement of General Wojciech Jaruzelski to start in Poland the common military manoeuvres “SOIUZ-80”. During the second session (December 5, 1980), Stanislaw Kania was the first who presented some point of view regarding the events from Poland. At the final of his speech, the Polish communist leader committed himself to annihilate, helped by the party he led, “the contra revolutionary activity” on the whole his country and declared he was disposed to put in practice other measures, too, besides the political ones (this practically being a veiled allusion to the introduction of martial law). The reunion in Moscow continued with the speeches of Todor Zhivkov, Gustav Husak, Erich Honecker, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Janos Kadar and Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev.

**Keywords:** Polish crisis, Warsaw Treaty, Solidarity, communist regime.

In the early 1970s, the Central and East European communist countries developed a relatively economic growing period, but the attained rate of developing was not of long standing. Gradually, these states began to confront a series of problems concerning the extremely slow development of the living standard of population and this perspective became more and more visible by the end of the 1970s.

For understanding the events from that period, we chose to present some aspects of the Polish crisis in the late 1970s and the early 1980s and

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the reactions of all leaders of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) members' states toward the Polish crisis, trying to find an answer for two essential questions: Which was the position adopted by the leaders of WTO members' states towards a possible military intervention in Poland, immediately after the signing of Gdańsk Agreements (August 31, 1980)? Which was the position of the same leaders towards a possible military intervention in Poland one year later, before the enforcement of the martial law on 13 December 1981?

The exponential development of the "Solidarity" and the permanent hesitations of Warsaw authorities, who avoided to enforce the martial law and to intervene in force for the repressing of popular movements in the entire country, determined the leaders of WTO members' states to meet at Moscow, on 4 and 5 December 1980 for convincing Stanisław Kania to utilize harder means to re-establish the order in Poland.

The respective reunion started on 4 December 1980 without the participation of the leader of Polish communist party (PUWP), only one day after Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov asked the agreement of General Wojciech Jaruzelski to start the military manoeuvres "SOIUZ-80" in Poland. Some documents didn't reveal anything regarding Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev's intention to create a powerful psychological pressure on Stanisław Kania, by using just the solicitation of his marshal, but we consider such an hypothesis may be true, because the Moscow authorities were interested to re-establish order in Poland, and the formulation by the Soviet part of some threats less or more veiled to the address of one WTO's state, couldn't be a novelty within the communist system from Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. "Hungary-1956" and "Czechoslovakia-1968" cases).

The meeting that took place on December 4, 1980, at Moscow had the purpose to know in detail the points of view of all participants towards the Polish crisis, to finalize the common strategy to be applied during the discussions on the next day with the PUWP leader. At that session, János Kádár and Nicolae Ceaușescu declared that they will not be supporters of a WTO' states military intervention in Poland.<sup>1</sup>

During the session from December 5, 1980, Stanisław Kania was the first who presented one point of view regarding the events evolution in his country. In the speech he presented in the reunion plenum, he firstly emphasized the fact that "the fundamental sources of the crisis that arose

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Stelian Tănase, *Miracolul revoluției. O istorie a căderii regimurilor comuniste* [*The miracle of the revolution. A history of the communiste regime failure*], București, Humanitas, 1999, p. 68.

in Poland are concentrated at the level of the central leadership of our party”. Then, the Polish leader remembered about “the immense material help which we have lately received from the Soviet Union”, as well as about “the help given by the German Democratic Republic and other fraternal socialist countries as well”<sup>2</sup>. Such a sentence revealed the fact that Poland received until that moment an important economic support especially from the part of USSR and GDR.

Also, Stanisław Kania thought right to submit a sui-generis fidelity oath towards Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, by emphasizing the important role the last one had for the fate of Poland. “We maintain permanent contacts with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with comrade Brezhnev personally – the Polish leader stated. We highly appreciate your opinions and advice, Leonid Ilyich. Your assessments of the difficulties in our country, of the conflicts in Poland were of fundamental importance. For the second time, Leonid Ilyich, the sentiment of appreciation for the characterization of the situation in Poland and our tasks for the future was indissolubly tied to your name. This contributes to the consolidation of Polish friendship and goodwill towards the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – the leading force of the international communist movement”<sup>3</sup>. In our opinion, the purpose of this declaration was obvious: Stanisław Kania wished to convince the Soviet leader he was devoted, in order to avoid the Poland invasion by the armies of the WTO’ states.

In order to present the causes that generated “the deepest crisis that has ever taken place in Poland”, Kania evoked a series of events during the post-war period and rhetorically asked: “What do the difficulties of this crisis consist in? In the fact mainly that it is not the first crisis, but the result of other crises that happened in Poland. Such events took place in Poznań [in 1956], and they were followed by changes in the leadership and a wave of revisionism in Poland. Such events also happened in 1968, the well-known demonstrations of the students, then the dramatic events in December 1970, on the Polish seaside, followed by the demonstrations in 1975, and, finally, in 1976. They were very dangerous demonstrations, triggered by price increases”<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Central History National Archives, *the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party – Chancellery Collection* (hereafter CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*), file 74/1980, pp. 48-49.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

The mass character of the crisis, as well as the extremely active participation of the young engineers, technicians and workers to the protest movements, worried very much the PUWP Prime-Secretary. Such a reaction from the part of the Polish working class was extremely dangerous for the communist regime and for the sacrosanct ideology all PUWP leaders appealed at. On the one hand, they precisely arrogated the qualities of exponents and defenders of the working class interests, but, on the other hand, they ordered in various moments (in the years 1956, 1970, 1976) the repressing by force of the worker movements of protest.

In Stanisław Kania's opinion, there was necessary "the understanding of all of the mechanisms that brought about the decomposition of the party, state, and economy of our country, of all the reasons and instruments that enabled the opposing forces to penetrate the working class and the counterrevolutionary forces to infiltrate it". Trying to indicate the guilty persons for the situation his country traversed, Stanisław Kania remembered about the Catholic Church implication to defence "the material interests of workers (...) mainly in Silesia, and on the coast of the Baltic Sea", as well as the financial and propagandistic support afforded to the "anti-socialist elements" by "the diversionist centres abroad, especially «Radio Free Europe» and the counterrevolutionary emigration circles"<sup>5</sup>.

Although he admitted that his predecessors made mistakes, Stanisław Kania announced one conclusion: if the ideology of his party was applied and the economic activities unfurled outside the state centralized system were not encouraged, Poland would never confront with such a crisis.<sup>6</sup> The communist leader thus emphasized the infallibility of the communist ideology and the way this was applied in Poland<sup>7</sup>, believing further on in a utopia. In our opinion, Stanisław Kania

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 49; 51.

<sup>6</sup> In his speech, Stanisław Kania stated: "The party turned out to be weak with regard to the ideological activity (...) It was too early for us to launch the slogan of building a developed socialist society. We did this while in Poland's villages the individual household predominates, in the situation where in the 1970s the private initiative strongly developed in trade and other sectors. From the experience we have gained so far it is apparent that when mistakes appear in the party's policy, the working class – the party's foundation – reacts to these mistakes just as it must react. Our adversaries, the counter-revolutionaries, the fascists, taking advantage of our incompetence, tried to channel all this through a political groove". *Ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>7</sup> The Polish leader stated: "We have tried to formulate certain assessments, certain programmatic stipulations in such a way that they correspond to the new circumstances. *The main point was the affirmation that it was not socialism that had caused these deficiencies, but the fact that socialist principles had not been observed; that it is not*

did not take into account the numerous tentative to impose this ideology, helped by the saying: “All who are not with us are against us! (All who are not communists are contra-revolutionaries, anti-socialists, adversaries, fascists, etc!)”.

At the same time, Stanisław Kania considered that the decision to negotiate with the Gdańsk workers representatives was well deliberated, though he was conscious that the situation Poland traversed “represents by itself a serious danger for socialism”<sup>8</sup>. Because the Polish leader concluded that “our party leadership came out of these strike-type conflicts with certain political advantages, in the sense that these conflicts were not solved by force but by political means, via agreements with the workers”<sup>9</sup>, we may ask if by chance, the Polish leader was not capable to understand the political significance of “Gdańsk Agreements”<sup>10</sup> or this was only a premeditated political artifice<sup>11</sup> he used

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*the party that should be blamed for this situation, but the fact that some mistakes had been made. We launched the slogan of re-establishing socialist principles in Poland, re-establishing Leninist norms in our party life, and observing socialist ethics and norms of impartiality.* The line adopted at the seventh Plenary Session was approved by the whole party, and by public opinion. *Within the framework of the party there existed, for a long time, a certain state of mind, a situation in which the party members and the party active (core) turned their backs on the issues they had to solve.* It is for this reason that of late, all the members of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee have taken part in the meetings with the party members, as well as in the meetings with non-party members, the party thus re-establishing its force and influence on the masses (our underlining)”. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48. Stanisław Kania also stated: “Even in the current difficult conditions, we think that the use of political measures to solve strike-type conflicts was appropriate. Different measures could have given rise to a wave of demonstrations, and bring about bloody confrontations”. *Ibidem*, p. 50.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>10</sup> Starting from Stanisław Kania’s declaration, we may ask: What kind of advantages a dictatorial political regime can obtain when it is confronted with a deep economical crisis? An economical crisis evidently presumes to loose political capital, not to gain it! When it comes to a political system based on the theory of unique party, the situation becomes more serious, because during the economical crisis are troubled the interests of the entire (unique) leading political class, fact which puts in danger inclusively the national security of the respective state.

<sup>11</sup> The balance between the admittance of the gravity of crisis Poland traversed and the wish to demonstrate that efficient measures were adopted for keeping the country under the control, between the emphasizing of political advantages which were in fact non-existing, and presenting the errors committed by the party leaders, had probably the purpose to create confusion among the listeners. A series of perturbation factors (information offered in cascade, the participants boredom, the speech length, the tension

for imposing his conclusions by an ambiguous reasoning/speech<sup>12</sup>. In our opinion, the rightfulness of that decision determined an effect exactly contrary to the one expected by the Warsaw authorities: loosing of control exercised by the communist party on the majority of Polish workers. The massif diminution of the numbers of members from the trade unions controlled by PUWP (about 6 millions in just three months<sup>13</sup>) demonstrates the imperative wish of changing of the Polish people, and changing meant renouncing at the communist ideology and

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of the historical moment), could act like inhibiting agents in the analysis processes of the participants at the reunion and, thus, the reasoning presented by Stanisław Kania could become, at least for the moment, acceptable/true for all.

<sup>12</sup> The Polish leader admitted, among others: *“We have done our utmost to re-establish the situation, but we have not succeeded in doing everything that was needed in regard to both the propaganda and the organization of the fight against the antisocialist forces (...) We have also underrated the great force represented by the pressure exerted by the hundreds of thousands of party members for the purpose of calling to account those who committed the serious mistakes that had caused the situation – so dramatic – of our country. Hence the necessity of making cadres changes (sic!). At the latest plenary session of the Central Committee the necessity arose of drawing conclusions about comrade [Edward] Gierek, who was invited to the plenary session but he did not turn up, and about comrade [Piotr] Jaroszewicz (our underlining)”*. CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 74/1980, p. 52.

In the Stanisław Kania’s speech may be observed that he pleaded a “pro domo” cause to assure his own political survival. But he did not tell the essential conclusion: PUWP lost on 31 August 1980 control on the Polish workers. In return, with the help of general auto-critical sentences, the Polish leader admitted two of the less important failures: the low efficiency of the communist propaganda and the insufficient organizing of the fight against “anti-socialism forces”. In the same time, he cunningly minimalized the guilt of the Polish communist leaders, by mentioning for the respective failure only the leaders who were during December 1970 – August 1980 on the top of the Polish political pyramid and who were already “proscribed” by Moscow: Edward Gierek, former prime-secretary of CC of PUWP, and Piotr Jaroszewicz, former prime-minister during the Gierek’s period.

Was Stanisław Kania not conscious by the fact the guilt actually belonged to the entire Polish political class? Did Stanisław Kania deliberately omit to pronounce other names, not to endanger his situation within his own party? In our opinion, both questions could receive an affirmative answer, because the lie by omission was part of the communist propagandistic arsenal, but only the following researches may confirm or invalidate these hypotheses.

<sup>13</sup> According to Stanisław Kania’s affirmation at the reunion in Moscow, “the [industrial] branch trade unions [which were controlled by PUWP] include somewhere about five million working people, while – unfortunately – about six million people joined the “Solidarity” trade union [since August 1980]”. *Ibidem*, p. 51.

disappearance of the political regime, which imposed it by force and maintained it by terror.

Consequently, we consider it was natural for Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and the other leaders of the states who were WTO members not to agree “the using of political measures to resolve the strike conflicts” and to consider the only method by which Stanisław Kania and his party colleagues could maintain their positions was the massive using of the security forces loyal to PUWP, against the leaders of “Solidarity”.

Analysing all these facts, we may formulate the following hypothesis: Stanisław Kania understood the fact that, suddenly, the main leaders of the PUWP and the leaders of the Polish security forces could be obliged to renounce at the privileges they afforded during a long period, by force, lie and trade of influence, because that privileges precisely contradict with the communist ideology they preached and defend. This hypothesis may be true because the Polish leader remembered in his speech about the fact that “in Poland there appeared a strong phenomenon of strongly criticizing the cases of many representatives of the leadership circles who enriched themselves, and used their situation in their own interests”. Stanisław Kania admitted, also, the fact that “much to our regret, this phenomenon has had a mass character in the last ten years” and announced that measures were adopted to analyze the respective situation by the Control Commission of PUWP.<sup>14</sup>

In order to convince the communist parties leaders who participated at the reunion of the fact that a military intervention in Poland of the armies of WTO members’ states was not necessary, Stanisław Kania briefly presented some of the concrete repressive and administrative measures<sup>15</sup> he took or was going to take in the next period: establishing

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52. Stanisław Kania stated: “The situation in the country is difficult, but it has a differentiated character. The most difficult situation is on the Baltic seaside, in the capital, and in the Wroclaw region. Positive changes took place in Silesia, Katowice, Krakow, and Poznań”.

<sup>15</sup> The Polish leader stated: “We had to take a whole series of steps of repressive and administrative character. Under the leadership of the President of the Council of Ministers, there works a general staff constituted by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, which monitor the application of a series of measures among which the introduction of military state [martial law] in Poland is included since the country’s constitution does not provide for such a situation. We envisaged such a measure only from a military point of view. In addition, an operation to take the most active leaders of the counterrevolution into custody is being prepared. The principles of ensuring connections and the functioning of mass propaganda means, along with the communication and transport ways, are also being prepared. We are also creating

of a special general staff (formed by the Political Bureau of C.C. of PUWP and led by the Polish Premier) for introducing the emergency state in the entire country; preparing of a vast operation to arrest the most important leaders of the anti-governmental protest movements; assuring of a total control on the mass-media, on the transport means and telecommunications; selecting of party members who remained “loyal to the communist cause” to form some armed special groups<sup>16</sup> to assure, if necessary, the enforcement of martial law.

The Polish leader presented, also, his opinion regarding the main problems he had to resolve in the next period. Firstly, he referred to the situation inside PUWP. This followed to be strengthened by a drastic limitation of the right of free expression.<sup>17</sup> The critics of the party members at the address of PUWP leaders were absolutely forbidden, because in the Stanisław Kania’s view, they affected the party ideological unity and led to the appearance of the supreme crime of the dissident communists, the fraction forming<sup>18</sup>. Also, the Polish leader did not agree

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special groups of party members whom we trust without reserve, and – if need be – we will give them weapons” (*Ibid.* p. 54).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* Until the beginning of December 1980, 19000 party members were already selected, and Stanisław Kania hoped that until the end of the same month he would have at his disposal 30000 of loyal men.

<sup>17</sup> The PUWP leader also stated: “The main issue is the party. *It is very important for us to come out of this situation of settling accounts* to understand the great danger menacing socialism in Poland. Not all of the party members realize this danger. *We underscore the necessity of ideological unity, of discipline, of the fight against factions, which – in our conditions – gives rise to attempts to create, throughout the country, several centres*, appeasement commissions, coordination commissions outside the party structure, with the regional committees, and in other instances. One of the organizers of this factionist activity was expelled from the party a week ago (our underlining)”. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

The respective interdiction was formulated by specific terms of the communist manner of speaking, as to only apparently respect one of the purposes of the ideology proclaimed by the communist propagandists: the right for free expression for the entire working class. In reality, due to the ideology they assimilated and promoted, the communist leaders from the whole world were from the beginning meant to become dictators. According to the communist ideology, only the working class had the right to designate the political representatives who would become at a certain moment leaders of the party-state. The conviction and destroying of the system with several parties by the communists, finally generated the appearance of dictators, who claimed/pretended social origins of workers to benefit of the support of the working class in whose name they pretended they led the country.

<sup>18</sup> According to the communist ideology, the working class had to fight both against the exploiting classes (the bourgeoisie and the landowners), but also against the

with the organizing of party Congress in those moments because he wished to avoid the PUWP splitting up. He admitted the fact that “we cannot be sure that we could have delegates [at the Congress] who are people faithful to the party cause, to Marxism-Leninism”<sup>19</sup> and announced that the Congress works were going to take place only at the end of the first trimester or at the beginning of the second trimester of 1981<sup>20</sup>.

In the second place, Stanisław Kania remembered the fact that mass-media was no longer entirely under the control of the communist party and promised he will continue to realize a series of changes to improve the propagandistic activity among the people.

In the third place, the Polish leader referred to the problem created by the “Solidarity” independent trade union that practically destroyed the trade union unity in Poland. In order to counteract the actions of the new trade union, Stanisław Kania announced that pressures were exercised to organize new elections within “Solidarity”, occasion to impose “trustful people of the party” in certain leading structures of the leadership of the “contra-revolutionary forces”. The infiltrating action of some secret agents within leadership of the “Solidarity” trade union was unfurled in the same time with criticizing its rules. Stanisław Kania considered that “Solidarność” was a simple trade union organization and, consequently, it had no right to interfere in the political problems of the country. Practically, the Polish leader wished to utilize attorney artifices against an organization he did not control, hoping to provoke as large as possible dissensions within the trade union leadership.

In his speech, Stanisław Kania mentioned also that the youth organizations controlled by the communist party followed to be further on supported, but he did not precise in what way that support was afforded. In the same time, the Polish leader declared that both the army and the security forces behaved well until that moment, and affirmed that the new recruitments did not influence in a negative way the discipline

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“fractioning” people, who would try to split up the worker movement from the inside. But such a view permitted the communist leaders (V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, N.S. Khrushchev, L.I. Brezhnev, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej etc.), in countless times, to forbid the right of free expression when they were criticized and contested by the ordinary members of the party – who invariably were accused by “fractioning” and, in most of the cases, violently eliminated.

<sup>19</sup> CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*, file 74/1980, p. 55.

<sup>20</sup> The works of the PUWP Congress started eventually on 14 July 1981.

within the state military structures, as long as the measures for a political-ideological education of the young recruits were maintained.

Also, Stanisław Kania referred to the Sejm activity and the popular council's activity and affirmed he did not agree with the organizing of general and local elections, as the leaders of the "Solidarity" trade union wished. In order to however stop the wave of discontent in the country, he disposed that at the end of the legislative activities unfurled by the Sejm, a session of interpellations would take place during an hour, with the participation of all ministers. Both the questions asked to the ministers, and their answers, were already live broadcasted by the Polish television.

The last important problem Stanisław Kania wished to present was that which referred to the economic crisis Poland traversed. He emphasized the fact that the merchandises existent on the internal market were insufficient (the difference between offer and demand was about 20% in the demand favour)<sup>21</sup>. As a result, the imports of food products increased, thus aggravating the problem of the country external debts<sup>22</sup> and the aliments repartition system was modified by introducing a rationalization through the aliments cards.

The situation was identically dramatic concerning the Polish exports. The reducing of coal production directly affected the country balance of payments because the coal formed important merchandise for the Polish export. Also, the tensions on the Polish internal market determined the Warsaw authorities to significantly diminish the export of modern TV sets with colour image, and also the automobile export, to may honour the massif demands on the internal market.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*, file 74/1980, p. 57.

<sup>22</sup> Stanisław Kania stated: "We also have serious problems in regard to our foreign debts. *Our debts* in connection with the short-term credits *amount to about 26 billion dollars. Next year we will have to import goods for about 10 billion dollars. Consequently, the exports will not be enough for us to make the payments for credits, and the whole import will be made on credit* (our underlining)". *Ibidem*, p. 58.

<sup>23</sup> According to the economical view of the Warsaw communist authorities, the industrial units that realized modern products of current consumption were built by the help of the external credits, and they had to export the absolute majority of the products they realized, in order to obtain the hard currency necessary for paying the external debts created when the respective industrial units were bought. Thus, an extremely restrictive economical circuit was created, which was profitable only as long as those products were realized with Polish labour force, which was extremely cheap, and exported at the high prices from the developed capitalist states. The communist economists did not take into account that the market of capitalist states functioned on other criterions, being very mobile and unpredictable on a long term. They tried to

The Polish communist leader admitted at the reunion in Moscow, without denial, that Poland economically depended by the financial credits and aid from abroad (offered both by USSR and the developed capitalist states, especially by USA and the Federal Republic of Germany<sup>24</sup>), but he considered that only the Western states generated threats with political character for the Warsaw regime, and not the Soviet Union. According to the respective reasoning, the massive economical support offered by USSR and GDR (mentioned just at the beginning of his speech) and the possible military intervention in Poland of the WTO members' states did not constitute a political threat for the Warsaw authorities because USSR and GDR and the "brotherly armies" intervened only to maintain the communist ideology in Poland. According to the communist theory, both the fractionating process inside the communist parties, and the fractionating process outside it, within "the international communist and worker movement", represented a political crime, and the concepts of national suzerainty and independence, of patriotism, were thrown to the history bin in the moment they appealed "the Brezhnev Doctrine".

Consequently, we can affirm that the support offered to Poland by the various international organizations and by a series of capitalist states, was refused by the Warsaw regime firstly from ideological reasons.<sup>25</sup> The invoking by Stanisław Kania of the reappearance of new salary claims in the case new Western financial credits were accepted represents, in our

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realize products according to the socialist economy rules, and sell them on a market where the production and selling rules were very different. Thus, we may say that the communist leaders tried to impose an economy which was planned from the level of political power's centre, not only to the countries they led, but also to the capitalist countries, where the freedom of action was in flagrant contradiction with the framing into a hyper-centralized "Procust's bed".

<sup>24</sup> Stanisław Kania stated at Moscow: "Poland is still very strongly dependent economically on capitalist countries, especially the Federal Republic Germany and the USA. This situation gives rise to certain threats of a political character". CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 74/1980, p. 58.

<sup>25</sup> Stanisław Kania stated: "*The United States gave us to understand that if we participate in the International Monetary Fund, we will have more advantageous credit terms. Our position is very clear on that score. We let the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union know our position, telling them that we will not make such a decision – first of all from the point of view of principle since we do not want to create a diversion in our family of socialist countries – and, secondly, because if we used such credits, certain pressures on us to increase wages on a national scale would once more gain impetus (our underlining)*". *Ibidem*.

opinion, a wrong justification<sup>26</sup>, which was meant to rather demonstrate his fidelity over the “common cause of the communism”. Stanisław Kania wished to maintain the Polish economy in the limits imposed by the communist ideological concepts (with the purpose to keep his political power), although this situation generated great problems for the national economy managing and leading, much more serious than a limited increasing of the worker salaries.<sup>27</sup> The Polish leader foresaw on December 5, 1980, that he would succeed to organize and stabilize the country’s economic situation in about three years, but to reach this purpose he needed “a powerful help”/massive economical support, especially from USSR.<sup>28</sup>

At the final of his speech, the Polish communist leader committed himself to annihilate, helped by the party he led, “the contra revolutionary activity” on the whole territory of his country<sup>29</sup> and declared he was disposed to put in practice other measures, too, besides the political ones (this practically being a veiled allusion to the introduction of martial law).<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> In our opinion, Stanisław Kania was conscious of the fact that the International Monetary Fund offered credits only for realizing a macro-economic stabilization in Poland and re-launching of some profitable economical activities, not for increasing the internal consumption.

<sup>27</sup> The Poland economical situation was so disastrous that this seriously affected the citizen living standard. Consequently, we may ask in what consisted, from a moral point of view, the communist humanitarianism the propagandists of the Warsaw authorities preached? In the macabre application of the communist ideology, which had to be maintained in Poland even with the price of sacrificing the life of all Polish citizens?

<sup>28</sup> “We took certain steps to stabilize the economic situation of our country – Stanisław Kania stated. *This activity will last about three years, and its purpose will be to organize and re-stabilize the situation in Brezhnev to grant us help, and we have guarantees from the Soviet experts.* We have already received a lot of help from *Polish economy*. To be able to come out of this difficult economic situation, *we need strong help*. We asked comrade the Soviet Union, a fact we highly appreciate. We are now drawing up an economic reform, which is prepared by an Economic Commission. We want to use the experience of the fraternal socialist countries (our underlining)”. CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*, file 74/1980, p. 58.

<sup>29</sup> Analyzing on the whole the Stanisław Kania’s speech, we may observe the fear/obedience he had towards Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who could at any time order the Poland invading, and also the wish the Polish communist leader had to deal tactfully with the Moscow leader susceptibilities in order to apply his own economical politics, that resembled very much with a politics of the fact already carried out.

<sup>30</sup> Stanisław Kania stated: “The most important is the party, its consolidation, its influence on the whole working class. A main condition is to stop the activity of the counterrevolutionary forces. The evolution of the situation can present us with the necessity to take steps not only of a political character. Rest assured, comrades, we will

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In order to demonstrate especially to the socialism adversaries that “Poland is not and will not remain alone in this hard period”, Todor Zhivkov started his speech from an ideological precept, well known by the communists: the proletarian internationalism.<sup>32</sup> He appreciated the events that took place in Poland starting from August 1980 did not constitute only a Poles problem, but a problem of the entire community of communist countries (that was inclusive the WTO members’ states). To support his affirmation, the Bulgarian communist leader invoked, successively, the following reasons which were entirely true: the Poland territorial dimensions; the important role the Polish state had within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in the conditions of existence of two great rival political-military alliances, NATO and WTO; the anti-communist actions in Poland could generate similar protest movements in the other states which were WTO members’ states (the Domino’s principle)<sup>33</sup>.

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be ready to act against the counterrevolution, for the defence of socialism in Poland”. CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*, file 74/1980, p. 59.

<sup>31</sup> According to some protocol rules established by the Soviets, the representatives of the states who participated at the reunions of the Warsaw Treaty Organization began to speak in the following order (it was taken into account how the first letter of the respective country name was positioned in the Cyrillic alphabet): Albania (since 1961 Albania did not participate at the WTO meetings), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, Romania, Hungary, USSR. During the extraordinary session in Moscow (5 December 1980) the respective rule was not respected by Stanisław Kania because the specific subject of that reunion: the special situation Poland traversed at that moment.

<sup>32</sup> “This meeting – the Bulgarian leader stated – represents an expression of the consistent internationalism that characterizes the relations between the parties and countries belonging to our socialist community. The socialism adherents, and also the socialism adversaries, both from the inside and from abroad, all will become aware that Poland is not alone and will not remain alone in this hard situation. This raises the state of mind of the healthy forces in Poland and will act to clarify those who believe Poland will be diverted from the course it chose”. CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*, file 74/1980, p. 67. An example of application of “the proletarian internationalism” in the name of “the communist cause” is invading of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 by the troops of five WTO members’ states (USSR, GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria).

<sup>33</sup> “We must take into account – Todor Zhivkov stated on 5 December 1980 – that Poland is the second in size among the socialist countries who are members of the Warsaw Treaty [Organization] and that we cannot admit any under-appreciation of the destabilization in Poland and of the events that took place. In the second time, Poland occupies an important place in the European balance of forces and the negative development, further on, of the events there, can provoke a chain reaction, with

In his speech, Todor Zhivkov declared that, in the opinion of Bulgarian authorities, and in his opinion, of course, the economic and political crisis in Poland appeared as a result of some mistakes committed by the PUWP leaders, at which added the actions organized by the ideological enemies from inside and outside the country.<sup>34</sup> In the same time, the Bulgarian leader emphasized the fact that at the level of PUWP leadership “it does not exist a clear appreciation of the events and it does not exist a program to get out from the actual situation”, and “the absence of a program is one of the causes this process continues”<sup>35</sup>.

After he critically appreciated the situation Poland traversed, Todor Zhivkov made a proposition for the crisis resolving. “Firstly – declared the Bulgarian communist leader –, *we consider the solution must be searched by the Poles themselves*. Various variants must be elaborated, according to the real situation, and *the Polish comrades must be ready to apply them inside the country by the forces of the PUWP and the Polish Popular Republic*. Our appreciation is reduced at the fact that such possibilities exist in the present (our underlining)”<sup>36</sup>. Todor Zhivkov considered that the Warsaw authorities spent almost all the political solutions and, consequently, he urged Stanisław Kania to use the Polish army and the security forces he had at disposal, against all who contested in a way or another the leading role of PUWP within the Polish society.<sup>37</sup>

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extremely grave consequences. In the third time, no doubt exists that the class enemy makes all the efforts to transform Poland in a factor of anti-socialist fight, which will influence the other socialist countries – and this is a real danger. That is why we have no right not to see these events or to underestimate them. The events in Poland must lead to conclusions for our countries, too and that is why we act in this direction”. CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 74/1980, p. 68.

<sup>34</sup> The Bulgarian leader stated: “Our appreciation is that here we deal with an economical and political crisis in the Poland development, provoked, on the one hand by the mistakes of the PUWP and on the other hand, by the actions of the anti-socialist forces, who, without doubt, act for a certain time inside and outside Poland”. *Ibidem*.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*.

<sup>37</sup> “*In our opinion* – Todor Zhivkov stated –, if there would be made a class appreciation towards the situation in Poland, we must say that *the possibilities of political approaching used by the Polish comrades are almost finished* (...) That is why *I believe that we must strongly act, joining peaceful and not peaceful means, using the army, the security organs and the police*, who must enter into the fight against the enemy, as the essence and the functions of the state organs ask it. Only this way, the balance of forces can be changed for the socialism benefit. *If they will not proceed this way, the danger exists to desegregate the proletarian dictatorship. We will not have other choice, too*. A

Implicitly, the Bulgarian leader proposal excluded an imminent execution of a military intervention in Poland by the armies of the WTO members' states, but, on the other hand, Todor Zhivkov affirmed in a veiled mode that an eventual failure of the PUWP leader would dangerously deteriorated both the Poland situation, and that of the WTO members' states, and such a crisis would inevitably generate a foreign military intervention (of the WTO) in Poland.

After Todor Zhivkov's speech, it followed the speech of the Czechoslovakian leader, Gustav Husák. He presented, at large, his point of view regarding the purpose of those who supported "The Prague Spring" and compared the situation in 1968 in Czechoslovakia with the evolution of events in Poland in the autumn of 1980<sup>38</sup>. In his opinion, the capitalist states were guilty for the political and economic crisis that appeared in the socialist countries<sup>39</sup>.

Gustav Husák approached also, the subject regarding the organizing of the works of the PUWP Congress. He advised Stanisław Kania to postpone the congress unfurl and firstly to realize a filtering of the party he led<sup>40</sup>. In the same time, the Czechoslovakian leader encouraged his Polish homologue to use without fear the repression forces, including the army units, against those who contested the PUWP leading role within

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favourable variant to defence the socialism in Poland is extremely important, both for the Poles and for us (our underlining)". *Ibid.* pp. 70-71.

<sup>38</sup> The Czechoslovakian communist leader declared at a certain moment: "In Czechoslovakia, also, at the end of '60s increased the spirit of not satisfaction in the society (...) The imperialism understood quite rapidly that because of this situation, a possibility opens to realize plans which were plotted during a long time, for capitalism reestablishment, and started this in Czechoslovakia. In the summer of 1968, what happened on the whole in our country was prepared during a long time by the imperialist forces, by various anti-socialist, contra revolutionary forces, and this resemble very much with the facts that took now place in Poland. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

<sup>39</sup> "If something negative happens in the socialist countries, the capitalist countries are responsible for this – declared Gustav Husák in Moscow. They want to extend the situation in Poland and Czechoslovakia, to the German Democratic Republic and to other socialist countries". *Ibidem*, p. 75.

<sup>40</sup> The Czechoslovakian leader mentioned, among others: "Some of the comrades present here, among who is the comrade Brezhnev, said so [in 1968]: do not rush, do not hurriedly convoke the congress. I listened to that advises and when the party was purified, when the links were in the communists hands, I prepared the XIV<sup>th</sup> Congress, which opened the way to the country socialist development, further on". *Ibid.*, p. 77.

the Polish society<sup>41</sup>, and gave himself as an example for the mode he decided to use force against his own citizens in August 1969<sup>42</sup>.

At his turn, Erich Honecker expressed his point of view regarding the crisis in Poland. He mentioned in his speech some statistical data concerning the help his country offered to Poland<sup>43</sup> and manifested his disappointment regarding the inconsequence of the PUWP leader, who promised he will not cede again towards the claims of “Solidarity”, but did not respect his word, accepting the legal registering and acknowledgement of that trade union.<sup>44</sup> In the same time, the East-German leader manifested his discontent related to the strikes unfurl in Poland, affirming that: “It is inadmissible that strikes take place in

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<sup>41</sup> The humanitarianism at which the communist leaders refer in their speeches, evidently came in contradiction with the violent measures they applied to maintain their power. The application of the communist ideology was firstly realized by force, by terror. For example, in Moscow, Gustav Husák offered Stanisław Kania a very self-evident advice: “In any battle is a risk. *The greatest risk is that to loose all the socialism conquers – and this thing must be avoided at any price. If there is necessary to resort to extreme measures, then for a people of 35 millions the effort is not the most painful one (our underlining)*”. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>42</sup> Gustav Husák briefly presented in his speech the situation he confronted with in August 1969: “When an year passed after the army forces of the brotherly countries entered in Czechoslovakia – declared the Czechoslovakian leader – in the country revived the anti-socialist forces in Prague and in other localities. But I warned them that the agitation do not help them. *The fights in Prague lasted three days, but I used force, the popular police, the state security organs, including the army. Then, only at Prague 2800 active participants were arrested, but not for a long time. They were registered and released.* From then, the anti-socialist, contra revolutionary forces did not appear any longer on the streets of our towns. *I realized this with our own forces; although on our country territory is the army forces of the allied countries.* The contra-revolutionary elements came to the conclusions about this situation and did not appear on the streets. *This, also, is one of the administrative measures which can be used by the socialist state in the given situation. So, the proper combination of the political measures with the administrative ones is rights (our underlining)*”. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>43</sup> “In this difficult situation – Erich Honecker stated –, we lent substantial material assistance to Poland. *We delivered to the Polish comrades 100,000 tons of wheat, 1,000 tons of butter, and other goods amounting to a total value of 3 million marks, including free convertible currency, as a non-reimbursable aid.* We know that the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other socialist countries also granted important aid to Poland (our underlining)”. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>44</sup> Erich Honecker stated: “*Comrade Kania assured us that the party and state leadership of Poland would not fall back a step further but the Supreme Court cancelled the decision of the court of justice in Warsaw [and it was accepted the official registration of the “Solidarity” trade union]. The consequence of this cancellation was that the situation worsened even more, and was a blow to the expectations of positive changes being made in Poland’s situation (our underlining)*”. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

socialist society. The strikes in socialist society are directed against socialism and are not useful to either the workers on strike or the working class in general. These demonstrations are directed against peace, security, and détente”<sup>45</sup>. Erich Honecker considered Stanisław Kania proved weakness both on a political plan and on the administrative domain, because he allowed the discussions about organizing free elections and the discussions about the errors committed by his predecessors, instead to impose his will by firm measures towards the claiming movement of the Polish workers. Also, the East-German leader considered the anti-communist groups of opposition in Poland were directed from shadow by the leaders of NATO countries and by the leaders of the countries from the European Economic Community.<sup>46</sup>

However, Erich Honecker declared that he agree with the opinion expressed at the beginning of November 1980 by Bruno Kreisky, the leader of the Social-Democratic Party in Austria, not to send in Poland military forces of the WTO members to resolve the political crisis.<sup>47</sup> After just a few minutes, the East-German communist leader took again the same idea in his speech and strongly affirmed: “We take the view that the popular forces in Poland are capable of solving their problems to their advantage”<sup>48</sup>. As his homologues from Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia did, Erich Honecker encouraged Stanisław Kania to use the force against the anti-communist groups of opposition, using both the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army. In the same time, the East-German leader agreed the idea proposed by the PUWP leader, that a part of the Polish population to be armed by the authorities and used in repressive actions against their fellow countrymen<sup>49</sup>.

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p. 84.

<sup>46</sup> Erich Honecker stated: “*The representatives of various groups emerging in Poland now state at the top of their voices that the aim of their actions is to serve the renewal of Poland. It is quite obvious, however, that the purpose they pursue is precise, and that – in attaining their goals – they are backed by NATO and the Common Market, which make every effort to support them in all of the actions they under-take*”. *Ibid*, p. 85.

<sup>47</sup> Erich Honecker argued his point of view thus: “While these issues were being analyzed at Poland’s Supreme Court, I was in Austria. On that occasion, [Chancellor Bruno] Kreisky and other persons asked me about the issues in Poland. Despite the fact that *our opinion about Poland being capable of solving the issues on its own was unanimous*, I tell you in all sincerity that when I heard about the decision of the Supreme Court I was not even thinking about it any longer, I did not expect such a result (our underlining)”. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, p. 84.

<sup>49</sup> “To our knowledge – Erich Honecker stated – *the Polish United Workers’ Party enjoys authority, and it can rely on the backing of the security forces and of the armed*

The speech of Erich Honecker was followed by the Nicolae Ceaușescu's speech. Unlike the other representatives of the WTO members' states, the Romanian leader briefly saluted the participants at the reunion, without evoking the name of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, the hostess of that reunion<sup>50</sup> and directly passed to the presentation of his opinion regarding the international political and economic situation. With that occasion, Nicolae Ceaușescu wished to affirm his intention to support the process of security increasing between the European countries, process started in Helsinki in 1975, and reaffirmed four from the five base principles of the Romanian external politics: the total equality in rights of all states of the world; respecting of the national suzerainty and independence; non-interference of other states into the internal affairs of Romania; renouncing at force and at threatening by force in the relations between states<sup>51</sup>.

Then, Nicolae Ceaușescu evoked the world economic crisis to emphasize the necessity for intensifying the collaboration between the countries COMECON members (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). He considered that one of the causes which determined the crisis apparition in Poland was just the insufficient economical

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*forces. We are of the opinion, therefore, that these bodies will do their duty. Comrade Kania gave me to understand that in Poland there also was the possibility of arming a sizeable part of the working class. We agree with what the other comrades said, namely that the Polish United Workers' Party should not allow itself any further steps backwards (our underlining)". Ibid. p. 85.*

<sup>50</sup> Only at the final of his speech, Nicolae Ceaușescu pronounced the following sentence of courtesy: "To conclude, comrades, I would like – in my turn – to thank the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and comrade Brezhnev for the organization of this meeting, and for their hospitality. Thank you". *Ibid.*, p. 47.

It is known the fact that the personal relations of Nicolae Ceaușescu with the Soviet leaders, including Leonid Brezhnev were rather cold, for the protocol. Consequently, we may consider that mentioning of the Soviet leader's name at the end of the speech of the Romanian leader – not at the beginning, as proceeded all the other leaders of the WTO members' states during the reunion in Moscow – was not a pure happening, but a premeditated action. According to our hypothesis, Nicolae Ceaușescu tried again to distinguish himself with his attitude of frond towards the Soviets, although the subject on the reunion agenda did not aim the political, economical or military situation in Romania.

<sup>51</sup> The fifth base principle of the Romanian external politics was collaboration with all states of the world.

collaboration between that states<sup>52</sup>, but he admitted in the same time the fact that “the preoccupation and desire exist for these issues to be solved by the Poles themselves, and they should not affect the policy of détente, collaboration, and peace”<sup>53</sup>. Such a declaration announced in a veiled mode, the decision of the Romanian leader to not participate at an eventual military intervention in Poland. Few minutes later, Nicolae Ceaușescu took again the respective idea in his speech, strongly affirming: “I want to declare right from the outset that the Romanian Communist Party, our Central Committee, the Romanian people take the view that the issues in Poland must be solved by the Polish United Workers’ Party, by the Polish working class, by the Polish people in full unity, starting from the necessity of insuring Poland’s socialist development, of uninterruptedly toughening its independence and sovereignty, its economic force, the people’s material and spiritual welfare, and the cooperation with the socialist countries”<sup>54</sup>.

Conscious by the difficult situation of Poland and of the fact that could negatively affect Romania, too, Nicolae Ceaușescu criticized the PUWP leadership for it permitted the development of a private sector within the economy. In his opinion, such an economical politics contributed at the appearance and development of a social stratification, which generated “strong class contradictions”<sup>55</sup>. Also, the Romanian

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<sup>52</sup> Nicolae Ceaușescu stated: “*In our view, some of the difficulties encountered by socialist countries, including the events in Poland, must lead us to conduct a very serious analysis – starting from the necessity of solving, to a greater extent, and via collaboration between the socialist countries – the issues of economic and social development, and of socialist and communist construction, using only our own forces (...)* I think I am not wrong *if I contend that if – over the years – we had thoroughly analyzed the issues of the development of socialist construction in our countries, the events in Poland could have been avoided* (our underlining)”. CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery, file 74/1980, pp. 39-40.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>55</sup> “It has many times been asserted that a rift exists between the party and the working class – Nicolae Ceaușescu stated. The very fact that various elements came to influence a significant part of the [Polish] working class shows the especially serious and grave character of the situation that appeared. *In our opinion, the situation in Polish economy must also be taken into account, more precisely the fact that two sectors, a socialist sector and a private production one, with many capitalistic elements – I am chiefly referring to the situation in agriculture – actually exist, which give rise to strong class contradictions, and are an important cause of the current state of affairs* (our underlining)”. *Ibidem*.

However, the Romanian leader avoided to present the implications of the development of bureaucratic apparatus of the PUWP, because thus he would implicitly reveal the

communist leader underlined the fact that the PUWP leaders did not prove political firmness in the summer of 1980, but he did not concretely explained how his homologue in Poland had to proceed; Nicolae Ceaușescu limited himself at the using of a consecrated expression from the communist manner of speaking, but extremely ambiguous by its content: “appropriate actions”<sup>56</sup>.

The Romanian leader came than back to the most important idea from the beginning of his speech, unequivocally declaring: “We do not want to meddle in the internal affairs of Poland”<sup>57</sup>. The respective crisis resolving depended, in his opinion, by the elaboration of a political program by the PUWP leadership in accordance with precepts of the

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essential problems of the Romanian Communist Party, almost identical with those of PUWP. Because the appointments in the important economical functions were realized on political criterions (for example: the industrial unit directors) and the low competence of the members of the party apparatus generated at a certain time serious economical problems, which the workers from various economical units observed. In the conditions the privileges offered to the members of the party apparatus were increasing as they were situated in a function with more important decisional power, but without proving a special economical efficiency, the Polish workers started to ask themselves if they were not led by some incompetent parvenus. The discrediting of the members of the PUWP/RCP bureaucratic apparatus started from the small echelons and, when time passed and the economical crisis in Poland/Romania accentuated, the workers gradually less trusted the leaders of the PWUP/ Nicolae Ceaușescu. Step by step, the lump of the hidden discontent of the Polish workers transformed at the end of the '70s in a real avalanche, which covered the whole political system in Poland and gravely affected the entire economy.

By the measures he imposed in Romania after December 5, 1980, Nicolae Ceaușescu succeeded only to postpone with some years the sombre denouement of the communism, described in Moscow by Stanisław Kania, and this delay led him eventually in the front of the firing squad.

<sup>56</sup> Nicolae Ceaușescu stated: “In fact, *in our view, if in the previous period [the Polish United Workers’ Party] had acted with more political firmness; things would not have been what they currently are. Even when intense dissatisfaction [with the situation in Poland] was expressed last summer, it would have been possible – via appropriate actions – to prevent things from becoming more serious and the occurrence of the well-known events.* I had the impression that even the Polish leadership had underrated the situation, and did not pay suitable attention to taking immediate measures to solve the issues. This made things get worse and worse for several weeks, and triggered the organization of the strikes and of the other actions (our underlining)”. *Ibidem*, pp. 41-42.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 43. Nicolae Ceaușescu also stated: “It is undoubtedly the task of the Polish United Workers’ Party, the [Polish] working class, the Polish people, and all of the progressive forces in Poland to find the most appropriate ways of overcoming the crisis situation, and of ensuring the economic and social development, the increase of welfare on the basis of the socialist construction in accordance with the conditions in Poland”.

communist ideology, which indicated the working class as the only progressive political force<sup>58</sup>. In the same time, Nicolae Ceaușescu declared that he did not agree with the idea that independent trade unions exist in Poland and sustained that “it is just the antisocialist and reactionary forces that try to cast doubt on the socialist achievements in order to undermine the leading role of the party and be able to promote their policy”<sup>59</sup>.

In order that the new political program should be successful, the Romanian leader considered that it was necessary to attenuate the critics inside PUWP at the address of their own leaders<sup>60</sup> to avoid the “fractioning”<sup>61</sup> and suggested the realization of an image campaign to present only positive events and realizations that advantaged the Polish communist party<sup>62</sup>. Also, he proposed the workers massive promoting “to

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<sup>58</sup> “*We think, however, that it is necessary to do everything possible to devise a clear orientation, to draw up a program that is very clear and can be adopted by the working class, the broad masses, the whole people, and which can [finally] become the program of action first of all of the working class – the Romanian leader stated. Without such a political program, adopted by the working class and the broad popular masses, the overcoming of the crisis situation cannot be conceived.* New ways of directly attracting the working class and the other social categories in the leadership of all of the fields of activity have to be found (our underlining)”. *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>60</sup> “*We think that more attention must always be paid to the people, to the cadres, even when they have made various mistakes. The punishment of some activists must in no way lead to a weakening of the party’s force but, on the contrary, should ensure the toughening of Communist responsibility and discipline – Nicolae Ceaușescu stated. We wish to tell the Polish comrades frankly that, in our opinion, the punitive measures taken against some cadres are played up too much (...)* More than ever, just in such circumstances, without overlooking the serious cases of some cadres, it is highly desirable to make every effort to achieve the union of the whole active, of all of the party’s forces, to insure the defeat of the antisocialist and counterrevolutionary forces and [to continue] the socialist development of the country (our underlining)”. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>61</sup> The Romanian leader stated at Moscow: “*I was very much surprised by comrade Kania’s assertion that there are several centres, that there is the danger of the unity of the party being broken and of factions appearing. This is actually, in my view, the main danger and such an eventuality would make it impossible for the party to fulfil its role. I believe that some antisocialist elements, allegedly by virtue of their possible good will, want to criticize some mistakes, deliberately determine that [punitive] measures are taken against some activists and cadres in order to discredit not only the latter, but the activists in general and, through their agency, the party in general, and the party’s role of leading political force (our underlining)*”. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>62</sup> “*It is for this reason that, in our view, more attention should be paid to the way the various aspects are criticized, and everything that is positive in the activity of the Polish*

various leadership positions until the Congress takes place, and will assume responsibility for insuring the organization of the Congress, imparting a revolutionary, workers' spirit to it"<sup>63</sup>.

Then, for the second time, Nicolae Ceaușescu returned to the idea of non-interference with troops from the WTO members' states in Poland<sup>64</sup> and declared: "We must not overlook the fact that the possibility of an intervention from abroad would be a very serious thing for socialism in general, and all the more for the policy of détente and peace"<sup>65</sup>.

At the final of his speech, Nicolae Ceaușescu took again another main idea – communist countries collaboration within COMECON – and tried to use the opportunity offered by the extraordinary reunion of the leaders of the WTO members' states to determine them to reunite in a

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*United Workers' Party*, of the Polish people in relation to the construction of socialism should be underlined – Nicolae Ceaușescu stated (our underlining)". *Ibid*, p. 44.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem*. Nicolae Ceaușescu proposed a solution which was not based on the efficiency criterions of the acts of political, economical, social or military leading. In his view, the simple worker origin gave a simple citizen the right to be promoted in leading functions within the party and state structures. The Romanian leader considered it was properly that some representatives to be elected from the Polish working class and rapidly promoted in various leading functions within the Polish communist party. Thus, some privileges were offered to the working class representatives, privileges they would not benefit of if they remained simple workers in the industrial units.

The upstarts' desire of the worker-citizens offered to the members of the PUWP propagandistic apparatus the possibility to attract by the communist party's side, by various methods, other workers, too, who tried at their turn to benefit of privileges, without proving a professional competence according to their pretensions. Thus, the Polish working class became again dependent by the privileges the PUWP leaders offered, and they could insistently claim the statute of representatives of the most numerous social classes in Poland. In Nicolae Ceaușescu's opinion, too, such a statute offered to the PUWP leaders the right to lead the country and to maintain their power with the aid of the party-state they created.

The respective principles were exactly applied in Romania after Nicolae Ceaușescu's return from Moscow.

<sup>64</sup> Nicolae Ceaușescu stated: "I would like to emphasize once more the fact that *everything necessary should be done by the Polish comrades* – who have an important duty, both national and international – *to solve their problems with their own forces*, ensuring the development of socialist construction (...) *we have to give the Polish comrades all our support to enable them to solve their problems by their own forces*, in the ways they deem to be the best and the most useful – and they have such ways at their disposal – *to ensure the development of socialist construction* (our underlining)". *Ibidem*, p. 46.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*.

new session to resolve a series of economic problems<sup>66</sup>. He mentioned from the beginning of his speech the fact that “a special case is constituted by the issues of the energy and raw material sources, which were not solved in a satisfactory manner”<sup>67</sup> and considered it was the right time to propose the organizing of another reunion at high level, as soon as possible. This rush of the Romanian leader, the moment he chose to make such a proposal and his unequivocal declaration, indirectly emphasizes the fact that not only the Polish economy traversed a crisis, but also the Romanian economy.

Then was followed the speech of János Kádár. He firstly presented the objectives of the reunion in Moscow: knowing the opinions of the session participants regarding the international political and economic situation and discussing from this perspective the Polish crisis; drawing up a common press communicate and its publishing, with the purpose of an propagandistic support for the Warsaw communist authorities; intimidating of all organizations who criticized the communist political regimes and especially of the anti-communist groups of opposition in Poland<sup>68</sup>.

Regarding the situation the Warsaw authorities confronted with, the Hungarian leader wished to emphasize the fact that “the situation created in Poland already reaches our heart, the heart of the Warsaw Treaty organization (sic!)”<sup>69</sup>. In his opinion, the causes that generated the

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<sup>66</sup> “In view of the limited duration and the character of this conference, *it is necessary for us* – Nicolae Ceaușescu stated – *to think about the organization of a new meeting at this level with a view to discussing in more detail the issues of economic collaboration and development of socialist construction in our countries and the strengthening of our solidarity and collaboration.* To do this is all the more necessary as *in the coordination of the five-year plans a series of problems appeared which presuppose a political approach* and have to be solved at the higher level of the party and state leaderships (our underlining)”. *Ibidem*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>68</sup> “This meeting – János Kádár stated – is of great actuality because it is consecrated to a problem that mostly preoccupies us now. I consider this meeting has, in the first place, three objectives of great importance: the first, to know each other opinions and to agree on this matter, regarding the international situation and, within it, the Polish problem; the second objective of this meeting is its Communicate, which will be public and will form an encouragement for the socialism adepts in Poland and in the entire world; the third objective consists in warning the socialism opponent forces in Poland and in the entire world”. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*. We may remark the fact that János Kádár used the name of “Warsaw Treaty organization” for the political-military structure founded on 14 May 1955, in contrast with the Romanian political leader who currently used only the “Warsaw Treaty” syntagm. It is possible the document translator not to write with capital letter the word

respective crisis were numerous; among these were the insufficient development of the Polish agriculture, the excessive rhythm of the industrial increasing and the increasing of worker salaries.<sup>70</sup>

Starting from the cause analysis, János Kádár described a series of problems the Polish crisis generated in Hungary, to express then clearly his intention not to support a military intervention of the WTO members' states in Poland. "We are solidier with PUWP – the Hungarian leader stated –, with the working people in Poland, with the working class, with the Polish people, but *we would wish that the Polish comrades resolve their problems by their own*, to find a socialist solution of the problem. *This is our position, which we declared in public, inclusively in the Parliament (our underlining)*"<sup>71</sup>. János Kádár was conscious of the fact that WTO had serious problems indeed, because of the Polish crisis<sup>72</sup>, but he considered there was a limit not to be passed over.

In order to be more convincing in his affirmations, the Hungarian leader declared in the plenum of the Moscow reunion that his opinion was already known by the official representatives of Yugoslavia and Great Britain.<sup>73</sup> In the same time, at the end of his speech, János Kádár remembered the fact that Todor Zhivkov, the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party, too, expressed a similar point of view<sup>74</sup>.

Regarding the mode in which the PUWP leader had to act for the stabilization of the political and economic situation in his country, János Kádár advised Stanisław Kania not to cede before the pressures exercised by the opposition groups, to use force<sup>75</sup> – inclusively to shoot in the

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"organization" because he was not accustomed to use the correct name, "the Warsaw Treaty Organization".

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> "In the end – János Kádár mentioned –, *I would like to say that I join the appreciation of comrade Zhivkov that the situation in Poland is a problem of the Poles themselves*, but it is also a problem directly linked with our interests and problems (our underlining)". *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>75</sup> "Returning as well to the party platform, the firm decision of defending the socialist system in Poland must be manifested in this – the Hungarian leader stated. Some events took place. *It must be clear that the PUWP and the Polish government will not search the problems resolving by force, but – if it is needed – they will shoot. Defending of certain things must be assured by any means*. This is the best way, if they know that any means will be used, because this will have a great influence over the adversary (...) *You*

demonstrators, if there was opportune – and to urgently elaborate a political program<sup>76</sup>. In the same time, the Hungarian leader encouraged the Polish leader in his decision to wait a more favourable moment for the unfurl of the Congress works, to rapidly purify the party<sup>77</sup>, and also to considerably attenuate the critics inside PUWP to the address of the former leaders<sup>78</sup> – idea expressed during the reunion by Nicolae Ceaușescu, too.

The last speech presented during the Moscow reunion belonged to the leader of the Soviet Union, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. Even from the start of his speech, he declared he was disturbed not only by the critical situation of the PUWP, but also by the way its leadership behaved. Wishing to demonstrate that he was permanently preoccupied by the fate of the communist authorities in Warsaw, Leonid Brezhnev affirmed that “in my conversations with [Edward] Gierek, I raised the issue of the negative tendencies which begun to manifest in Poland many times in the last few years”<sup>79</sup>. In his opinion, the PUWP leader hid him every time the truth about the real situation in Poland, even with the occasion of the meeting they had in Crimea<sup>80</sup>, in Vnesniaia Oreanda, on 31 July 1980<sup>81</sup>.

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*must be ready for all kinds of administrative measures, not only political measures (our underlining)*”. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>77</sup> János Kádár also stated: “As far as we know, the PUWP counts 3 millions members. The present situation is more peculiar. *The Congress must not be organized now. Firstly the party must be purified.* At the present the main thing is not how many party members are on the paper and how many comrades comprises the classified list. The principal thing is if they adhere at the party platform. *If we want unity at any price, if we base on compromises, nothing will be resolved.* That is why, *firstly the party purifying must be fulfilled (our underlining)*”. *Ibid.*.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>80</sup> Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981*, Special Working Paper No.1, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, April 1999, p. 41.

<sup>81</sup> “*Even this year – Leonid Brezhnev stated – during the discussions I had with the Polish comrades in the Crimea, I raised the question that action is necessary against the counterrevolutionary elements. It said that anything is produced. What was this? Was superficiality, ambition, arrogance? I do not know.* Now the consequences of the Polish crisis have become very serious not only for Poland but also for the whole community of socialist countries, for the international communist and workers’ movement. The Polish crisis can negatively influence the general ratio of forces (our underlining)”. CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*, file 74/1980, p. 60.

Although he correctly observed the fact that Edward Gierek and the other leaders of the Polish communist party made mistakes<sup>82</sup>, Leonid Brezhnev decided/dictated that they would no longer be criticized. According to his ideological conception, the public admittance of the mistakes committed by the communist party leaders, the responsibility assuming of the facts committed by the communists represented a blasphemy. *“It is inadmissible – the Soviet leader stated – that, under the pretext of lying the blame on some persons, the party is the fall guy for all of these mistakes from the past, and in this way the system as such to be disparaged. It is not good that the Communists be put in the situation of repenting in the front of opponent (our underlining)”*<sup>83</sup>.

The Soviet Union leader reminded in his speech about the discussion he had with Stanislaw Kania in November 1980 and about the decisions they took together: “to re-establish the fighting capacity of the party, to make all of the party’s components active”, to rely “on the healthy forces of the people, the army, the Militia and the security forces, and that part of the trade unions that remained faithful to the party”, and also “we must not wait for the enemy to push the party into a deadlock”. Leonid Brezhnev considered the claiming actions of the “Solidarity” were encouraged by the Catholic Church and these were combined with those of the Peasant Party and of the Democrat Party. Consequently, the decisions adopted by both communist leaders had as purpose “the defending of socialism”, in the conditions that an “acute class fight” was unfurling against a centre that are “leading the counter-revolutionary actions in Poland”<sup>84</sup>.

Although the turning round, typical for the communist manner of speaking, “the wood manner of speaking”, strongly marked his speech, Leonid Brezhnev succeeded to be more concrete than all the others leaders of the WTO members’ states regarding the characterization of the situation in Poland from an ideological point of view (the famous “acute development of the class fight”) and in establishing a direction of action for resolving the Polish crisis. *“We have received with good faith the*

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<sup>82</sup> The Soviet leader criticized the PUWP leadership because they neglected the ideological work, launched the slogan of the nation renewal – fact that generated “the darkening of the class fight”, “started to withdraw at the first contact with the strike movement”, and made mistakes in planning the economical and social constructing of Poland. The leaders of the Polish communists were not only criticized, but also bantered by Leonid Brezhnev, who stated: “It is easy to issue a slogan: let us give each worker a car, and feed him from the budget”. *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61.

*declarations of the Polish comrades stating that they want to solve the crisis by political means – the Soviet leader stated. We are not partial to extreme measures if they are not necessary. We will be patient, but there is no certainty that the enemy will be equally restrained. If the enemy comes to power, he will use the most extreme measures. In fact, the enemy has not minded the choice of his fighting means for a long time. The enemies of socialism say that the occupation of enterprises, of the transportation and communication means are peaceful means, that they do not use violence. The actions of deriding the men in military uniforms, sabotaging the supply of foodstuffs and other goods, hiding foodstuffs to worsen the situation in the country, the illegal introduction of foreign currency and of foreign mass information media into the country, the attacks on honest people, the threats of a violent settling of accounts with the Communists, makes it impossible for us to speak of a restrained behaviour of the opposition. Consequently, whether we like it or not, the confrontation is in full swing. The most painful thing is that this confrontation is now taking place on a platform imposed by the adversary (our underlining)*<sup>85</sup>.

Wishing to determine the PUWP leader to be more firm when he took the decisions – which presumed, among others, the enforcement of the martial law<sup>86</sup>–, Leonid Brezhnev appealed at the slogans used by the members of the communist propagandistic apparatus and at his own linguistic clichés created in his youth: “*If things go on like that in the future, in our opinion the issue of the social system being overthrown will only be a question of time –the Soviet leader stated. That is why, comrades, it is our duty to call a spade a spade. A very serious danger hovers over socialism in Poland. The enemies succeeded in digging a moat between the party and the working people (...) The Polish comrades must say firmly and convincingly: no step back, but only forward to consistently regain, one after the other, the positions lost by the party, to re-establish the leading role of the party, to launch an offensive.*

*We say “yes” to the improvement of socialist democracy, which presupposes the active participation of the working people in the leadership of society.*

*We say “yes” to the role and activity of the trade unions.*

*We say “yes” to an improved manner of leading society.*

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<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>86</sup> In order to thoroughly prepare the enforcement of the martial law, Leonid Brezhnev proposed during the reunion in Moscow “to create organs of the Central Committee that can be used in sectors of vital importance to the socialist state”. *Ibid.* p. 64.

*But in an equally determined manner we say “no” to the attacks against the party, against socialism, and we say a categorical “no” to the counter-revolution which tries to throw Poland into anarchy and chaos, which tries to over-throw and destroy the socialist system in Poland, under the banner of the renewal of socialism (our underlining)”<sup>87</sup>.*

The Leonid Brezhnev’s slogans were immediately followed by promises with economical character. The Soviet leader announced that his country put at Poland disposal, as aids, credits in currency and in convertible roubles, food, raw materials and other kinds of merchandises. The total value of the Soviet economic support was of about 2 billion dollars, from which 1300000 were offered in hard currency. In addition, the Soviet Union participated, together with Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic, to the creation of a fund of aids for Poland which exceeded 450 million dollars.<sup>88</sup>

In the Soviet leader’s opinion, the measures with economical character had to be accompanied by actions against the members of “Solidarity” trade union and the Catholic Church. Thus, Leonid Brezhnev imperatively demanded to Stanisław Kania not to pay salaries to the strikers and to try to influence the moderated church circles to calm together the population<sup>89</sup>. He also reminded about the extremely important role the mass media had and about the necessity that PUWP leaders re-establish an efficient control of it<sup>90</sup>.

In the end of his speech, the Soviet leader declared that “in Poland, the situation was not declared exceptional, but in fact – as I pointed out here – such a situation exists” and consequently, urged the Polish communist to be prepared “to take extraordinary measures against their adversaries”<sup>91</sup>, namely to enforce the martial law. In the same time, Leonid Brezhnev advised the Warsaw authorities to be reassured that the army and the Polish security forces permanently controlled the railways and ports and suggested the immediate application of some special measures to supervise the ways of communication, as the establishment of special military commandments and military patrols along the railways and roads, even if the martial law was not yet enforced.<sup>92</sup> Blocking of the terrestrial and maritime ways of communication in Poland would

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64-65.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

generate serious military and economic problems not only for the Polish state, but for the other communist countries, especially for the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, because Poland had an extremely important strategic position within WTO, being a real turn-table between those states.

According to the desire expressed by Leonid Brezhnev, all the leaders of the states WTO member who participated at the reunion in Moscow on 5 December 1980, signed at the end of the session a common press communicate, by which was suggested the decision of the socialist countries to help Poland, but without offering other information.

The secret-mania that possessed the minds of the communist leaders was applied at once by Nicolae Ceaușescu, too, who deliberately avoided to present on 16 December 1980, during the session of the Executive Political Committee, his conclusions regarding the discussions he had at the reunion in Moscow on 5 December 1989, although on that session agenda was explicitly foresaw for him to present information about the respective meeting<sup>93</sup>. The Romanian leader's declaration resumed at the following phrase: "Those who are in Bucharest<sup>94</sup> read the materials. The comrades [from the Executive Political Committee], who came from the counties, will read them, too, so we will not make now a presentation"<sup>95</sup>.

Although Nicolae Ceaușescu refused to discuss about the crisis in Poland on 16 December 1980, in the Romanian newspapers appeared on the next day an ample communicate where the President of Romania was extremely praised for the activity he unfurled at the reunion in Moscow. In the press communicate was specified, among others: "(...) The comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu presented, in the continuation of the [Executive Political Committee] works, an information concerning the meeting of the state and party leaders of the countries which participate at the Warsaw Treaty, that took place in Moscow on 5 December this year"<sup>96</sup>. The press communicate exactly reproduces the largest part from the protocol content of session (December 16, 1980).

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<sup>93</sup> The agenda of that session (December 16, 1980) was the following: "I. The program regarding the population supplying; II. The decision's project regarding the 1981 New Year's Eve Celebration and of the Winter Tree; III. Proposals regarding various activity domains; IV. Information regarding the Moscow's meeting of the leaders' party and state from the countries which participate at the Warsaw Treaty". *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>94</sup> That was about the members of the Executive Political Committee who activated in Bucharest.

<sup>95</sup> CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*, file 74/1980, p. 24.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Analysing all three documents, we may easily observe a contradiction between, on the one hand, the press communicate and the ExPC. Session's protocol and, on the other hand, the shorthand report of the same session. Because a fact is obvious that, Nicolae Ceaușescu did not present the Executive Political Committee any verbal or written information about discussions from the Moscow reunion, we may affirm that the information offered to the "popular masses" by the regime propagandists was a lie.

Nicolae Ceaușescu's dictatorial way of leading in the field of external politics clearly appeared on December 16, 1980, during the session of the Executive Political Committee (ExPC). At the same reunion, Nicolae Ceaușescu decided, and all the ExPC members completely consented "discussing within the base organization of RCP" and excluding from the party of Constantin Pîrvulescu<sup>97</sup>. Was it a simple coincidence? The measure dictated against Constantin Pîrvulescu really represents a reaction of the Romanian leader after he listen the speech presented by Stanisław Kania in Moscow on 5 December 1980? Within a future research theme, it is possible we find the answers at these questions. A thing is nevertheless certain: during the reunion in Moscow,

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<sup>97</sup> Constantin Pîrvulescu (10 October 1895 – 11 July 1992), member of Central Committee of Romanian Workers' Party (hereafter: CC of RWP) (21 October 1945 – 25 June 1960), president of the Central Commission for Control of CC of RWP (21 October 1945 – 28 December 1955), member of the Presidium of the Great National Assembly (the Communist Parliament of Romania) (13 April 1948 – 24 January 1953), member of the Political Bureau of CC of RWP (27 May 1952 – 25 June 1960), president of the Party Central Collegium (28 December 1955 – 25 June 1960), the president of the Central Control Commission (25 June 1960 – 12 August 1969), member of the Central Control Commission (12 August 1969 – 23 November 1979). Cf. Gheorghe Crișan, *Piramida puterii. Oameni politici și de stat din România (23 august 1944 – 22 decembrie 1989)*, Editura PRO HISTORIA, București, 2001, p. 227.

In the last day of the XII<sup>th</sup> Congress of RCP (23 November 1979), Constantin Pîrvulescu, member of the Central Control Commission, exercised his right "to criticize of principle, in the party meetings, any party member, no matter his function, with the purpose of work improvement (our underlining)", right foresaw at article 3, position b, in the RCP Statute. Concretely, Constantin Pîrvulescu unexpectedly intervened during the plenary session of the party Congress and hardly criticized Nicolae Ceaușescu, accusing him for monopolizing the entire political power. His speech was not published in the work of the Romanian communist propaganda: *Congresul al XII-lea al P.C.R., 19–23 noiembrie 1979* (hereafter *Congresul al XII-lea*), Editura Politică, București, 1981. Details about that incident in *Istoria României în date*, editor: Dinu C. Giurescu, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2003, p. 675; Vasile Toma Vlase, "Incidentul Pîrvulescu" la *Congresul al XII-lea al PCR*, in "Dosarele Istoriei", Year XI, no. 2 (114)/2006, pp. 20-22.

Nicolae Ceaușescu understood that his homologues from Poland committed a mistake when they permitted to be criticized inside their party. Consequently, the Romanian leader should not repeat the mistakes of the Polish leaders if he wanted to maintain his power, and any form of opposition at the address of his regime should be rapidly annihilated, including by dismissing from RCP of some “veterans”, as Constantin Pîrvulescu<sup>98</sup>.

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<sup>98</sup> According to article 11 from the Romanian Communist Party Statute, a RCP member was excluded from the party in the case it was proved he “performed grave violations of the party program, of its general political line, strikes the party unity, enters into a compact with the enemies of socialism construction, is not sincere and cheats the party, divulges party and state secrets, in the cases his behaviour proves moral decomposition or he commits other things that contravene to the statute’s rules”. *Statutul Partidului Comunist Român*, Editura Politică, București, 1979, pp. 29-30.

According to the communist democratic centralism, which was “the fundamental principle of the organization structure and of the party activity”, the superior structures of RCP leadership had the right to exclude a party member from a base organization without asking its agreement. In the same time, the party statute foresaw that “the decisions of the superior organ are unconditionally compulsory, for the party organizations and for all party members from its radius of activity”. *Ibidem*, pp. 50-51.

Another rule of the RCP Statute established that “excluding of a member of the party Central Committee from the Central Committee, and his excluding from the party, too, are decided by the party congress, and between the congresses by the plenary of the party Central Committee, with a majority of two thirds of its members”. *Ibidem*, pp. 31-32.

Although the RCP Statute foresaw the mechanism by which a member of CC of RCP could be excluded from the party, the same was not applicable for the members of the Central Control Commission (commission chose by the party Congress). As well, in the mentioned statute was clearly specified the fact that “the members of the Central Control Commission can not be chosen in the same time as members of the party Central Committee”. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

Constantin Pîrvulescu’s case put certainly into difficulty the members of a commission designed by the Executive Political Committee (which assured the leading of the party activity between its plenary) and who had to examine “the content, the causes and purpose pursued by Constantin Pîrvulescu by his provoking, anti-party and inimical attitude manifested at the XII<sup>th</sup> Congress of the party”. CHNA, *CC of RCP – Chancellery*, file 74/1980, p. 3.

The respective problem found its solution after one year (16 December 1980). It is possible the members of the respective commission tried to find a suitable formula to eliminate Constantin Pîrvulescu, and they evidently invoked the democratic centralism to impose their decision. In the same time, they wished to avoid the recognition of the natural right of Constantin Pîrvulescu to criticize the party leader and especially the appearance in mass media (from abroad) of some information regarding the problems the RCP leadership confronted with.

The threats concerning a possible intervention in Poland of the armies of the states which were members of the WTO, formed even after the Moscow's reunion in December 1980 a way of pressure used by the Warsaw authorities in the negotiations with worker leaders to temperate their economic and political claims. However, Stanisław Kania was not succeeding to master the situation in the country, and the strike started on January 24, 1981, at the appeal of "Solidarność", for reducing the working week at five days<sup>99</sup>, deteriorated even more the position of the communist leader.

The "Solidarity" trade union had problems at its turn because of the splitting that existed between the moderates (pragmatics) and the radicals. However, both groups agreed the idea that "Solidarity" would not pretend to take the political power, to avoid a military intervention of the WTO armies in Poland. In the same time, the union's members supported the idea of not soliciting their own government the repudiation of Poland international engagements, especially those which referred to the alliance with USSR and the affiliation at the WTO. "Poland is not an independent country – admitted Lech Wałęsa –, and its government must be acceptable for the USSR leaders"<sup>100</sup>. The union leader thought in that moments in "the revolution auto-limitation" and tried to obtain by negotiations a series of compromises in the discussions with the representatives of the government led by Józef Pinkowski.

A new ceding of the Polish government towards the worker claims<sup>101</sup> led to the dismissal of Józef Pinkowski on February 9, 1981. Stanisław Kania was obliged to appoint, with the Soviets agreement, a new Prime-Minister, in the person of Wojciech Jaruzelski, who kept the Defence portfolio, too.

Three days after his appointment, the new Prime-Minister demanded in public the worker representatives not to start strikes in the next three months, explaining that Poland economy was about to collapse.<sup>102</sup> His initiative surprised the leaders of the independent trade unions.

Trying to obtain the social peace needed for the country recovering, General Wojciech Jaruzelski appealed at the national sentiments of his

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<sup>99</sup> Cf. Thomas Parish, *Enciclopedia Războiului Rece*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2002, p. 365.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 299.

<sup>101</sup> According to an agreement realized between the representatives of the Pinkowski government and those of the "Solidarity", the workers followed to benefit of free time on Saturday, two times a month.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Thomas Parish, *Enciclopedia*, p. 365.

people, too, by reminding in a veiled mode about the danger of a Soviet military intervention in Poland. In order to demonstrate the respective threat was real, both General Wojciech Jaruzelski and the leadership of PUWP accepted that, during 17-25 March 1981<sup>103</sup> military manoeuvres took place, manoeuvres organized by the Commandment of the United Armed Forces of WTO, in Poland and in the German Democratic Republic (the war operative games named “SOIUZ-81” and “DRUJBA”).<sup>104</sup> More than that, “SOIUZ-81” extended from 25 March until 7 April 1981<sup>105</sup> as a result of the demands of Wojciech Jaruzelski and Stanisław Kania. The respective application would continue after that date, too, if in the respective period the Polish soldier’s moral did not dramatically diminished. Their commanders noticed this aspect to the Soviets, inclusively to the Marshal Viktor G. Kulikov, and openly expressed their wish to not imply at that moment their troops to enforce the martial law<sup>106</sup>.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s efforts to save what could be saved, without instituting the martial law, were however overthrew by the

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<sup>103</sup> Andrzej Paczkowski, Andrzej Werblan, *On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland*, Working Paper No. 21, Cold War International History Project, Washington, D.C., November 1997, p. 18. The historian Wojtech Mastny sustains, on the other hand, that the respective military exercises started on 16 March 1981. Wojtech Mastny, *The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-81 and the End of the Cold*, Working Paper No. 23, Cold War International History Project, Washington, D.C., September 1998, p. 19.

<sup>104</sup> With the aid of the American espionage satellites, the military leadership of NATO was permanently kept well informed on unfurl of the military events that took place in Poland. A week before the starting of the “SOIUZ-81” military manoeuvres, one of the satellites succeeded to identify the moving of some armoured cars to the country’s capital. This detection determined the government in Washington to take up an attitude towards a possible foreign military invasion in Poland and they immediately sent a warning message to the Soviet authorities in order to force Moscow to renounce at its possible invading intentions. Cf. Jean-Louis Dufour, *Crizele internaționale. De la Beijing (1900) la Kosovo (1999)*, Editura Corint, București, 2002, p. 159.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Wojtech Mastny, *The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-81 and the End of the Cold*, Working Paper No. 23, Cold War International History Project, Washington, D.C., September 1998, pp. 20; 22.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22; Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981*, Special Working Paper No.1, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, April 1999, pp. 96-97; Andrzej Paczkowski, Andrzej Werblan, *On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland*, Working Paper No. 21, Cold War International History Project, Washington, D.C., November 1997, p. 28.

dramatic situation of the Polish economy. Forced by the circumstances, he announced on 26 March 1981 that his country was temporarily ceasing the payment of the external debts and solicited to the creditors the rescheduling of all Poland external debts.<sup>107</sup>

Although the Polish Prime-Minister was confronting with an unprecedented economic crisis, which eventually determined him to declare that his country had no longer the capability to pay the financial obligations it assumed, the Moscow authorities followed to press him to prepare as rapidly as possible the documents for enforcing the martial law.<sup>108</sup> In the same time, Leonid Brezhnev and Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the chief-commander of the United Armed Forces of WTO, noted in turn the fact that both Stanisław Kania and Wojciech Jaruzelski were trying to postpone as much as they could the Moscow decisions applying. In the session of the Political Bureau of CC of CPSU on April 2, 1981, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Andrei Gromyko expressed in various ways their worry concerning the situation in Poland. The general secretary of CC of CPSU considered that the worker movement led by Lech Wałęsa was in fact a contra-revolution. "All of us are deeply alarmed by the further course of events in Poland – Brezhnev stated. What's worst of all is that the friends listen and agree with our recommendations, but in practice do nothing. In the meantime the counterrevolution is on the march all over (...) Kania described the recent plenum of the PUPW Central Committee and, in so doing, complained that they had been roundly criticized at the plenum. I then said to him: «They were right in doing so. They shouldn't have just criticized you; they should have raised a truncheon against you. Then, perhaps, you would understand». These were literally my words"<sup>109</sup>.

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<sup>107</sup> Cf. Joseph F. Harrington, Bruce J. Courtney, *Relații româno-americane, 1940-1990*, Institutul European, Iași, 2002, pp. 450-451.

<sup>108</sup> During January-September 1981 the main documents regarding the enforcement of the martial law were finalized. Andrzej Paczkowski, Andrzej Werblan, *On the Decision to Introduce Martial Law in Poland in 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland*, Working Paper No. 21, Cold War International History Project, Washington, D.C., November 1997, p. 11-12; Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981*, Special Working Paper No.1, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, April 1999, p. 16.

<sup>109</sup> Vladimir Bukovski, *Jugement à Moscou. Un Dissident dans les Archives du Kremlin*, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1995, p. 442; Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981*, Special Working Paper No.1, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, April 1999, p. 92-93.

In order to clarify the Polish communist leaders about the more drastic attitude they had to adopt, Leonid Brezhnev made a proposal, too: "In particular, I think it would be worthwhile to act in accordance with the wishes of the friends by permitting Cdes. [Yuri] Andropov and [Marshall Dmitri] Ustinov to go to Brest [-Litovsk, near the Soviet-Polish border] for a meeting with Cdes. Kania, and Jaruzelski". Yuri Andropov immediately reacted at the proposal made by the general secretary of CC of CPSU and declared: "I believe the proposal offered by Leonid Ilyich [Brezhnev] regarding our next steps *vis-à-vis* Poland and his assessment of the situation there are absolutely correct. Indeed, what we're trying to find now is some way of exerting greater influence and greater pressure on the leadership of our friends"<sup>110</sup>. At his turn, Andrei Gromyko intervened in discussion, trying to temperate the ardour of those who desired to send the WTO troops in Poland, and declared: "In addition, they [both the American and the West European] speak a great deal about the Soviet Union, as though warning us that the Soviet Union must not use its armed forces to interfere in Poland's affairs"<sup>111</sup>.

The following question may naturally appear: Which were the causes that determined the two Polish leaders to postpone the imposing of the martial law in the summer of 1981? In the case of the PUWP leader, his tendency for delaying the things was natural, in the conditions he wished to successfully organize the works of the party Congress, as he announced even on 5 December 1980, with the occasion of the reunion in Moscow. For Stanisław Kania, this could be the last hope to save his own political career. Regarding the attitude adopted by Wojciech Jaruzelski, this was ambivalent because, on the one hand, he was a disciplined and patriot career soldier, who knew very well what meant the army force and who wished to establish the order in his county, and, on the other hand, who was in the same time conscious and worried by the fact that the enforcement of the martial law could provoke a civil war. That is why, the Polish Prime-Minister wished to thoroughly prepare the entire operation, to avoid the losses of human lives and of goods.

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<sup>110</sup> Vladimir Bukovski, *Jugement*, p. 443; Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981*, Special Working Paper No.1, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, April 1999, p. 94.

<sup>111</sup> Vladimir Bukovski, *Jugement*, p. 443-444; Mark Kramer, *Soviet Deliberations During the Polish Crisis, 1980-1981*, Special Working Paper No.1, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, April 1999, p. 95.

The unfurl works of the Extraordinary Congress of PUWP at the middle of July 1981, aroused a special interest both from Moscow, and the Western states. Among others, it was well known the fact that “The Prague Spring” annihilation in August 1968 was realized just before the start of the congress of the Czechoslovakian communists, in the moment when it was waited the victory of the reformists led by Alexander Dubček. And the measures taken by the Soviets, starting from August 1980, let to foresee the very possible repeating of the military intervention of some states which were members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, for this time in Poland.

Although Moscow tried by several means to influence the decisions adopted at the PUWP Congress<sup>112</sup>, the Polish communists decided to massively purify the Central Committee of PUWP and the Political Committee, but also to maintain Stanisław Kania as party Prime-Secretary (21 July 1981)<sup>113</sup>.

These measures did not succeed to attenuate the political, economic and social crisis Poland traversed and, under the insistent pressure of Moscow, Stanisław Kania ceded without conditions the PUWP supreme leading function to General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Concentration of the entire political and military power in the hand of the Prime-Minister allowed, in the end, the enforcement of the martial law on the night of 12 to 13 December 1981 and rapidly arresting of the majority of the leaders of “Solidarity”, and so the anti-communist fight in Poland passed into a new phase.

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<sup>112</sup> For example, Vitalii Pavlov, chief of KGB residence in Warsaw, received an order from Moscow to have “a discussion with S. Kania and Jaruzelski and to remind them their previous declarations that they are ready to renounce at their functions in party and government, if that was for the interest of socialist system salvation in Poland and of the unity of the socialist block in Europe”. Cf. Vasili Mitrokhin, Christopher Andrew, *Arhiva Mitrokhin. KGB în Europa și în Vest*, Editura Orizonturi, București, 2003, p. 522.

<sup>113</sup> From the 8 members of the Central Committee, only one was re-elected, while at the Political Bureau were kept only 4 members, the other 7 being replaced. Cf. Stelian Tănase, *op.cit.*, p. 74.