

THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FROM 2004: RESULTS, CONSEQUENCE AND DELIMITATIONS

Cezar AVRAM*

Abstract: The endeavour of the authors is directed into the presentation of a period in which the Romanian political scene was dominated by the use of public manipulation methods, with dramatic effects for the democracy. It was the post-December period, when the trust of the citizens in the public authority was undermined, being generated mistrust, passivism and potential violent reactions of revolt against the entire political class. The country notes, published by the European Commission in the years of 2005 and 2007, mentioned that, in Romania, there were accentuated the unbalances from the economic sector, there were increased the deficits and the political and moral crisis deepened, although in 2007 Romania entered in the European Union. The first stage of presidency of Traian Băsescu damaged the social peace, which made any governing attempt be received with mistrust, by the society. Crucial moments in the history of the right and, as well, left formations were starting

Keywords: electoral campaign, suspending, Constitutional Court, political crisis, minority Government.

According to the Constitution of Romania from 1991, revised in 2003, the *President of Romania* has an important role in balancing the state powers. They are part of the executive power, meeting the essential prerogatives of the state leader. The fundamental law defines the Romanian semi-presidential political regime, yet having a series of differences compared to other similar regimes. The President benefits by popular legitimacy, resulted from their direct election by the electoral body, while the government is appointed by the state leader, based on the investiture vote given by the Parliament. According to the Constitution, the president of Romania “enjoys the function of representation, of guarantor of the national independence, territorial unity and integrity, the mediation function, as well as the responsibility of watching over the observing of the Constitution”¹. The

* Professor, PhD., “C.S. Nicolăescu-Plopșor” Institute for Research in Social Studies and Humanities from Craiova, of the Romanian Academy; E-mail: avramcezar@yahoo.com

¹ See more, Avram Cezar, Roxana Radu, *Regimuri politice contemporane: Democrațiile*, Craiova, Aius Press, 2007, pp. 199–201.

President, as state leader, represents the Romanian state, identifying themselves with it. The election through universal, equal, direct, secret and freely expressed vote is done with the majority uninominal voting, in two ballots.

The constitutional possibility of the state leader to assume political and juridical responsibilities before the Parliament, along with the relations between the constitutional powers of the state head and the Premier, constitute the most significant differences of the semi-presidential regime from Romania².

Looking retrospectively at the electoral year of 2004, the Romanian political scene was dominated by the use of public opinion manipulation, which triggered detrimental consequences for the democracy. Within the electoral campaign from the year in case, it was undermined the trust of the citizens into the public authority, therefore generating mistrust, passivism, and potential violent reactions, of revolt against the entire political class³. The drawing back from the presidential race of Teodor Stolojan, and the electoral fraud case represent two examples that illustrate the manner in which the manipulation was used, in the attempt to influence the result of the vote.

The liberal leader, Teodor Stolojan, went through all the stages and rules imposed by the presidential candidature. Since 2002, he had announced his intention to run for presidency. During 2003-2004 he carried out electoral tours through the country and determined PNL (National Liberal Party) to associate with PD (Demarcate Party) for founding the Alliance for Truth and Justice (DA) with the purpose of obtaining a stronger political and organisational support⁴. The statistics data of CURS poll, made between the 23rd-28th of September 2004, showed that Teodor Stolojan was credited with 36% of the Romanian's voting options, while 45% of the questioned opted for the PSD (Democrat Socialist Party), Adrian Năstase.

Until the local elections from 2004, PSD had the highest chances to win the competition for the presidential elections. The result of the local elections showed that the city-hall elections from some important cities had been won by PSD and DA equally, while the county council elections gave hopes to the Alliance leaders. The social-democrats came forward again, after they had experienced failure at the local elections in the fall of 2004, when Adrian Năstase and PSD took the political initiative. Despite the DA Alliance efforts, the victory of the PSD candidate at the presidential elections was shaping.

In the context of the DA losing the elections, it occurred the dropping out of Stolojan, from the electoral competition and the leadership of PNL, on the 2nd of October 2004. Stolojan's drawing back was an attentively considered decision, meant for polarizing, through manipulation, the public sympathy for the DA

² *Ibidem*, p. 199.

³ Radu Murea, Natalia Vlas, *România după 20 de ani*, Bucharest, European Institute, 2010, p. 93.

⁴ See Alexandru Radu, *Un experiment politic românesc. Alianța Dreptate și Adevăr PNL-PD*, Bucharest, European Institute, 2009, p. 11.

Alliance⁵. The drawing-back had an *extraordinary character* because the announcement of his dropping-out was made on a week-end day (on Saturday), leaving the impression, for the electorate, that the next step could not be postponed anymore, due to the health conditions experienced by the DA candidate. The announce was made without giving detailed medical explanations, invoking the absolute discretion on the causes and the symptoms of his condition. It was as well intended the increase of the public compassion level on addressing the *ill-feeling* person and his political partners. The attending of Stolojan's wife to the press conference was necessary for strengthening the idea of illness severity and the increasing of the compassion and solidarity among the public opinion. Along Stolojan family, there was also Traian Băsescu. The bursting into tears of the PD leader increased the tension and the degree of compassion the public would have for the new candidate for presidency, Traian Băsescu. The emotion and the sufferance that the electorate would have to witness, represented the guarantee that the idealised role-model, owing to his disappearance under dramatic circumstances, would be continued. The successor Traian Băsescu was prolonging, though himself, the spirit of "the passed-away candidate"⁶. The later discovery of the so-called *messianic* role of Traian Băsescu would prove overdue.

Teodor Stolojan and his wife, after the announcement of the dropping out from the presidential race, left Romania hastily. Their leaving, for the electorate, confirmed the severeness of Stolojan's sufferance, who would need urgent and special treatment abroad.

The manipulation of the public opinion continued, shortly after, when Traian Băsescu declared that, as a matter of fact, Teodor Stolojan did not drop out of the presidential race for health reasons, but because he was blackmailed by PSD⁷. Though this declaration, there was being anticipated that the entire positive image leverage that would be gained, as a consequence of the unexpected dropping out of the liberal leader, would be transformed into hostility and hatred against the representatives of the *wretched* system. Traian Băsescu announced his candidature for the presidency, concomitantly with the accusations against PSD. There was an attempt for a PR coup, taking advantage of the public sympathy capital manifested for Stolojan's sickness, of the hatred against the party that caused his sickness,

⁵ "Ovidiu Șincai" Institute, *Raport de analiză politică. Analiză privind manipulările în campaniile electorale*, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 22–23.

⁶ The idea to use the disappearance or the withdrawing from the political stage of an important leader, in order to suggest the *supernatural* mission of the successor did not represent, entirely, an innovation. In the electoral campaign from 1996, the death of Corneliu Coposu was used by CDR that promoted the idea of the historic mission of observing and fulfilling the political and moral objectives of the *Senior*, which became sacred after his passing-away.

⁷ "Stolojan dies not need a surgery – said Traian Băsescu – he is not in an operable condition; he is now enjoying the staying in a peaceful location, surrounded by nature ... he (Stolojan – A/N) was blackmailed by being sent fake information to the media" (Alexandru Radu, *op. cit.*, p. 78).

along with the increased visibility of the mass-media event. After the presumed electoral effect, Traian Băsescu expands on the *blackmail argument*, while Mona Muscă and Călin Popescu Tăriceanu deny it, stating that Stolojan *is not a person that could be blackmailed*⁸.

We consider that the event was projected to create a mix of negative and positive emotions, favourable for the DA Alliance candidate. Traian Băsescu, as an authentic continuator of Stolojan's political inheritance, as Emil Constantinescu was introducing himself until 1997, as "the political legatee of Corneliu Coposu", was the beneficiary after the manipulation. Traian Băsescu did not answer for deception, nevertheless he benefited by it⁹.

An already consecrated instrument, in all the electoral races from Central and Eastern Europe, at that time, was that to use the *negative tactics*¹⁰. The governmental parties used such negative strategies less, preferring to show their success achieved while exercising the power.

In the period 2000-2004, the opposition parties adopted a negative attitude against the party in office. The referendum for revising the Constitution from 2003 was criticised by the DA Alliance, also being formulated, on this opportunity, electoral fraud accusations on addressing the Government and the PSD. In the first part of 2004, both DA Alliance and PRM (Great Romania Party), supported by NGOs, launched and supported the argument of the future elections by PSD. Despite the rumours, the local elections were carried out under appropriate circumstances, being accepted as free and correct. In order to pave the way for denouncing the electoral fraud, the opposition parties launched the *state-party* argument, a syntagm used to describe the credibility of some eventual accusations related to the use, by PSD, of the state institutions to remain in office for ever. According to the above-mentioned argument, the state institutions being in the service of the governing party, the elections could be frauded only to its own interest¹¹.

Due to the equilibrium given by the result of the local elections from June 2004, both DA Alliance and PSD declared themselves a winner. The Alliance temporarily abandoned the argument of election fraud, which was supported further on only by PRM and the leader of this party, Corneliu Vadim Tudor, who was known for having a tradition in promoting such theories.

The event that facilitated the re-bringing forward of the election fraud subject was represented by *The Orange Revolution from Ukraine*¹². In Romania, the

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Apud *Ibidem*, p. 79.

¹⁰ "Ovidiu Șincai" Institute, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 26–27.

¹² The orange revolution, also called the Chestnut-tree Revolution, due to the presence of these trees in the centre of Kiev, was marked by a series of protests, blockages and general national strikes, organised by the supporters of Victor Ivchenko, the candidate for the presidency of Ukraine. Kiev, Lvov and other big cities refused to admit the legitimacy of the election results. Nevertheless, Ivchenko took a symbolic oath of office, thus, proclaiming himself a president (*Ibidem*, p. 32).

images related to the Orange Revolution from Ukraine, broadcast on television, contributed to the forming of the public opinion on the similarity between the situations from Romanian and Ukraine¹³. Thus, it emerged a tensioned psychological context, dominated by the fear for political instability and street riots, a fact that could have hindered the European integration of Romania.

After the elections from the 28th of November 2004, Adrian Năstase obtained 40.94% of the votes, and Traian Băsescu 33.92%. PSD+PUR (Romanian Humanist Party) Union won the elections with 36.6%, compared to 31.3% of the votes obtained by DA Alliance. For the presidential elections from November 2004, there were 12 candidates running, in the first round, for the chair of president of Romania. The allocation of votes, in this first round, was:

Number of electors: 18,449,344;

Expressed votes: 10,797,653 (58.5%);

Valid votes: 10,452,205;

Annulled votes: 342,448;

The difference of votes between the first two places: 733,628¹⁴.

In the context of a possible win of the presidential elections by Adrian Năstase, it is reiterated the argument of the frauded elections. The second round would prove confusing due to his returning.

On the 29th of November 2004, APD (Pro-Democracy Alliance) declared that they would withdraw the observers for the second round, as protest against the voting irregularities and the weaknesses of the normative system. The APD declarations, without specifying that the elections had been frauded, voluntarily prepared the acting of Traian Băsescu. The declarations of this political formation triggered negative effects, increasing the irascibility of the electorate and orienting their dissatisfaction towards the governing party, suspected of electoral fraud. Thus, it is amplified the confusion amongst the electors.

On the 30th of November 2004, the DA candidate for the presidential elections requested, officially, the annulment of the elections and their repeating, considering *the massive fraud that occurred*. The DA Alliance lodged a criminal complaint at the Department of the Public Prosecutor and Police, invoking the fact that the voting from the 28th of November was *altered* through the electronic transfer of a percent from the null votes, in the accounts of Adrian Năstase and of PSD+PUR National Union. The leaders of PNL-PD alliance (Călin Popescu

¹³ The democratic forces were represented by the orange colour, both at Kiev and Bucharest, while the state-party was represented by the blue colour.

¹⁴ The distribution on votes of the candidates: Adrian Năstase (PSD+PUR Alliance) – 4,278,864 votes (40.97%); Traian Băsescu (DA Alliance) – 3,545,236 (33.92%); Corneliu Vadim Tudor (PRM) – 1,313,714 (12.57%); Marko Bela (UDMR) – 533,446 (5.10%); Gheorghe Ciuhandu (PNTCD) – 198,394 (1.90%); George Becali (PNGCD) – 184,560 (1.77%); Petre Roman (FD) – 140,702 (1.35%); Gheorghe Dinu (independent) – 113,321 (1.08%); Marian Petre Miluț (AP) – 43,378 (0.42%); Ovidiu Tudorici (URR) – 37,910 (0.36%); Aurel Rădulescu (APCD) – 33,455 (0.34%); Alexandru Raj Tunaru (PTD) – 27,225 (0.26%). Source: <http://ro.wikipedia.org>.

Tăriceanu, Traian Băsescu) requested the dismissal of Central Electoral Office (BEC), as being part of the fraud, the arresting of the director of the company, Liviu Drăgan, that prepared the soft for the counting of the votes, the supervision of the Statistics department and the sealing of the computers, and, especially, the verifying, by neutral specialists, of the softs that calculated and validated the results of the elections. Traian Băsescu explained that the buses with people being moved around and voting for 3-4 times (a fraud estimated to approx. 300,000 votes) are added to the fraud of the elections through the counting softs. Although OSCE appreciated that the elections from Romania were free and fair, nobody considered the verdict of this international institution. Through the accusations against the power, Traian Băsescu managed to counterbalance the psychological effect created by PSD+PUR Union. Under the emotional circumstances, the vote of the electorate from the urban region gained the value of a penalty against the candidate of a party, who was perceived as incorrect and immoral¹⁵.

The election fraud theory had a great influence, because PSD did not demonstrate convincingly that they elections had been fair. Although the expertise made by the CESID Serbian company on the soft proved that it could not allow electoral frauds, the appeal of Băsescu-Tăriceanu, received, from the Public Prosecution, the resolution of not commencing the criminal prosecution. Yet, the decision of the Prosecution was delivered late, because it was delivered approximately a year after the elections, and it did not generate any moral or political effect.

Moreover, the appeals of DA Alliance against the BEC members were rejected, being considered unfounded. Traian Băsescu, once elected president, did not approach the subject again, therefore, not assuming any responsibility. The other leaders of the DA Alliance behaved similarly. The sealing of the files and not commencing the criminal prosecution were kept secret, their existence being revealed accidentally. The accusation of the PSD+PUR union, on addressing the multiple voting, was not proved¹⁶.

DA Alliance blocked, in the Parliament, the constituting of a commission of investigation that was to inquiry on the solidity of the accusations on the election fraud. In reality, this fraud theory was a manipulation, with electoral relevance because, psychologically, a great share of the electorate considered such an argument as being relevant.

In the electoral campaign from 2004, there were used *foul messages*, not being used the *foul telephone conversations*, as in the electoral campaign from 1996. Thus, it was created a feeling of collective guilt and embarrassment amongst the people who voted for PSD¹⁷.

¹⁵ "Ovidiu Șincai" Institute, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁶ The North-Station case, where the number of voters on the special lists was high, along with the presence of the numerous buses in the area. The surprise was the fact that DA Alliance obtained twice more votes than the PSD+PUR Union (*Ibidem*, p. 37).

¹⁷ On the internet, it also circulated a Letter from Congo, whose ending was: "If branches tap my window pane/ And you rely on Bombo/ I'll hang myself on the first branch/And make my grave in Congo" (Tismăneanu Vladimir, Mircea Mihăeși, *Cortina de ceață*, Iași, Polirom Press, 2007, p. 30).

The campaign for the demobilisation of the PSD voters and for the creation of a culpability feeling, among them, continued with text-messages on the mobile phones, a fact that needed the intervention of BEC for stopping this campaign.

Another strategy was that of *confession and repentance*. In their last TV conference between Traian Băsescu and Adrian Năstase, Băsescu declared that both him and Năstase were communists, asking rhetorically “why is the Romanian people cursed to always have to choose between two communists”¹⁸. Through his self-identification as a communist, Traian Băsescu intended to symbolically delimitate himself from the *FSN (National Salvation Front) acolyte image*, for attracting the right-voting electorate. Moreover, there was intended the demonstration for the electorate that he was *more sincere and more authentic*, compared to his opponent. The confession of his sins, made by Traian Băsescu, aimed at attracting the public sympathy, although he did not assume his resignation.

The second ballot was on the 12th of December 2004. Traian Băsescu was the winner, with 51.23% from the total expressed votes, outrunning Adrian Năstase, who obtained 48.77%¹⁹. Traian Băsescu, representing the DA Alliance, obtained 5,126,894 votes, while Adrian Năstase, representing PSD+PUR Alliance, obtained 4,881,520 votes²⁰.

The election process from 2004 was technically freely expressed, although there occurred deficiencies addressing the organisation. Nonetheless, the free opinions of the citizens were influenced, undesirably, by a manipulation campaign organised and carried out of the opposition parties, which would collaborate with several NGOs.

Traian Băsescu would nominate Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, the PNL president, as Prime Minister, *despite* the result of the 2004 elections. There was formed an improvised coalition, from a party belonging to the socialist international, PD, a right party – PNL, a former ally of PSD. To it, there were added PUR and UDMR (Democrat Magyar Union from Romania). This coalition, formed in an ad-hoc manner did not have an internal agenda, coherent governing and negotiation procedures, lacking experience on addressing the carrying out of some complex processes and the increasing of the living standard. Thus, it is created a governing precedent of a coalition without a vision and political mandate.

The political platform that Traian Băsescu used for winning the 2004 elections had three directions:

- The fight against the communism and the condemning of this calamity;
- The fight against the former political class, which meant the disclosing of the Security;
- The fight against corruption.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

¹⁹ The poll from December 12th 2004: number of electors – 18,316,104; expressed votes – 10,112,262 (55.2%); valid votes – 10,008,314; annulled votes – 103,948; the difference of votes between the candidates – 245,374. Source: <http://ro.wikipedia.org>.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

Thus, it appears an electoral platform of Băsescu in which the populism and the confrontationism made him come victorious. The concept of populism and fear against the enemy's menace, led to the occurring of the division and social fracture situations. The obsession for the public image of the governors and of Traian Băsescu took unhealthy directions, becoming emblematic, in the Romanian politics. The leader of the state became hyperactive on the political subjects, but in a context that was displaying pronounced emotional dimensions. The state reform was put aside, taking the second place. The public administration remained, further on, in a superficial process, while the public education and health services had sterile attempts on addressing the solutioning of the citizens' necessities and expectations²¹.

In the period 2004-2007, although the economic growth during the PSD governing was a continuous one, in the political life from Romania, the populist centralism, represented by Traian Băsescu and his power group (the discretionary control on the public resources, the control of privatizations and the auctions, for the interest of a *clique* etc.), the oligarchic feudalism that intending the *division* of the Romanian state into different area, administrated directly or informally by an oligarchy, constituted negative orientations that led to the *anticipated elections argument*²².

Since 2005, Traian Băsescu had declared that the anticipated elections constitute a variant for the crisis situation, and he was a supporter of them, even ones occurring immediately, in order to get rid of an immoral solution, which was called PUR (the party of Voiculescu)²³.

The relations between power and opposition, with a *variable geometry*, are characterised by fluidity and ambiguity. The differences in vision on addressing the efficiency of the means that would lead to the fulfilment of the governing objectives, created tensions, determined by conjunctural interests, as much as the ad-hoc alliances. The main feature of the relations between the president Traian Băsescu and the political class was represented by the undemocratic increase of the presidential power, after a systemic process of weakening the other public institutions.

Considering the incompatibility between the manner in which Traian Băsescu exercised his presidential mandate and the constitutional definition of state leader, his suspending and dismissal from the position of President of the Republic, appeared as a safeguarding measure for the Romanian democratic system. The blockage of the democratic mechanisms constituted, in 2017, the cause for the Romanian political crisis, which lead to the country being non-governed, lagging its EU priorities, through the removal its decisional mechanisms.

²¹ Lavinia Stan, Lucian Turcescu, *1989–2009. Incredibila aventură a democrației după comunism*, Bucharest, European Institute, 2010, p. 56.

²² Vladimir Tismăneanu, Mircea Mihăeși, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–39.

²³ Traian Băsescu was aware that, for triggering the anticipated elections, there were required laborious constitutional procedures, due to art. 89, 106 and 110 from the Constitution.

The year of 2007 started tempestuously, on the night of December 31st, when PNL and PD, still allies, celebrated the New Year Eve separately. On the 7th of February 2007, the Prime-Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu requested the postponing of the debate on the suspending of the president, for the elections for the European Parliament to be organised. Later on, the Prime-Minister decided (March 12th 2007) the postponing of the elections for the EP without the PD agreement, which led to the worsening of the political crisis. PSD had informed, since February 12th 2007, the Constitutional Court on the initiation of the procedures for the suspending of Traian Băsescu from the position of president²⁴.

On the 28th of February 2007, the Parliament approved the founding of an investigation commission on the suspending of the president²⁵.

On the 21st of March, Dan Voiculescu announced that the report elaborated by the commission determined that president Băsescu “infringed the Constitution and it was involved in criminal actions”. On the 5th of April, the Constitutional Court acknowledged with the majority of votes that the suspending proposition of Traian Băsescu “refers to acts and facts of Constitution infringement, committed while exercising the mandate, which through their content and consequences cannot be qualified as severed infringements that would trigger the suspending of the president of Romania, according to the provisions of art. 95, section 1 of the Constitution, and he was given negative decision to the proposal of suspending”. The decision of the Constitutional Court, being only consultative for the Parliament, allowed *the chosen of the people* to vote the suspending request on reason of unconstitutionality²⁶.

The suspending represented, in the post-December politics, a premier, being considered, by its initiators, a *quarantine* meant to stop the demonisation of the political class and the state’s institutions²⁷. On the 23rd of April, the Parliament voted an amendment proposed by PSD, according to which, if half of the citizens that had the right to vote did not exercise it, the Constitutional Court invalidated the referendum²⁸.

²⁴ The suspending request included four important charges, among which: the state leader had infringed, premeditatedly, the Constitution since his first day of mandate, with the purposes of imposing a dictatorial regime; the president used, discretionally, according to his own interests, *the force institutions of the state*, protecting the interests of a profiting clique and desiring the paralysation and the discreditation of the state institutions (Vladimir Tismăneanu, Mircea Mihăeși, *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 212, 213).

²⁵ 258 votes for, 76 against (PD and PLD), 21 abstentions (UDMR). Dan Voiculescu, the leader of the conservatives, was elected the president of the commission.

²⁶ 322 votes for, 108 against, 10 abstentions (Vladimir Tismăneanu, Mircea Mihăeși, *op. cit.*)

²⁷ Two days before the suspending, Traian Băsescu declared that he would resign five minutes after the Parliament had suspended him. President Băsescu, after the validation of his suspending by the Constitutional Court, affirmed that he changed his mind, motivating that a dismissal would accentuate the political crisis (*Ibidem*).

²⁸ 238 votes for, 2 against, 4 abstentions, after PD and PDL exited the room.

On the 3rd of May 2007, the Constitutional Court decided, with a majority of votes, the modification of article 10 of the law no. 3/2000²⁹. After the firing discourses of Traian Băsescu and some other parliament members, among which Ion Predescu, there started an ample campaign for the mobilisation of the electorate. Prime Minister Tăriceanu himself, in an interview given to ‘Europa liberă’ radio station called Traian Băsescu a person who took advantage on the communist period, who lacked political know-how for exercising his presidential role, proposing a parliamentary or monarchic model.

On Saturday, the 19th of May 2007, it was a referendum with the participation of 44.5% of the right-to-vote citizens. Among them, 74.4% participants voted against the president’s dismissal³⁰.

The priorities that Băsescu announced in his campaign were aiming at the introduction of the uninominal voting for the election of the deputies, the adopting the law of lustration, the modification of the Constitution on addressing the variant of a presidential or parliamentary decision. All these signified *the cleaning of the political class*, actions that, without a parliamentary majority did not prove possible. Traian Băsescu, in his dispute with Tăriceanu³¹, created, for a while, a blockage.

On the 1st of April 2007, Tăriceanu dismissed the ministers that were PD members and would form a minority government together with UDMR³². The New Government, resulted from the governmental restructuration proposed by Prime-Minister Tăriceanu, was validated on the 3rd of April 2007, in the united plenum of the Parliament, with 302 votes for and 27 against³³. The new ministers took the oath of allegiance before the president of Romania on the 5th of April 2007³⁴. The year of 2007 was that when the President, the Government and the Parliament were in conflict, each trying to be the strongest voice at institutional and public level. There was going to follow a period in which the moral crisis, the political crisis and the economic crisis were not going to be resolved until 2009, when there occurred a new electoral campaign for the function of President

²⁹ “The Official Gazette”, part I, no. 84/24th of February 2000. Through derogation by art. 5, section 2, the president dismissal is to be approved provided it met the majority of valid votes, expressed in the country, by the citizens who participated to the Referendum (www.hotnews.ro/arhiva_avt3825.pdf).

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 219.

³¹ The refusal to appoint Adrian Cioroianu as minister of the external affairs, after the resignation of minister Ungureanu (Press communicate of the Government from the 21st of March 2007).

³² *Romania's prime minister names new Cabinet of minority government*, Associated Press (*International Herald Tribune*), 2nd of April 2007.

³³ Adam Brown, *Romanian Lawmakers Approve New Cabinet in First Test of Support*, Bloomberg.com, 3rd of April, 2007.

³⁴ The new Government had Călin Popescu Tăriceanu as Prime-Minister, who would remain in the position until the 22nd of December 2008, although on the 24th of September 2007, PSD would file a censor motion against the Government, signed by 139 Parliament members. The motion was voted by 220 members, from the 374 present, 152 were against and two votes were annulled (*Jurnalul Național* from Oct. 4th 2007.)